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03 February 2009
Written Answer to Parliamentary Question on Status of Implementation of Recommendations on Committee of Inquiry into Mas Selamat’s Escape, 03 February 2009
Dr Teo Ho Pin:

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs what is the status of the implementation of the recommendations by the Committee of Inquiry into Mas Selamat’s escape from the Whitley Road Detention Centre.

Mr Wong Kan Seng:

The Committee of Inquiry (COI) into Mas Selamat’s escape from the Whitley Road Detention Centre (WRDC) assessed that the WRDC’s custodial protocols and procedures over handling of detainees were generally sound. Nonetheless, the COI made ten specific recommendations to rectify weaknesses that it had observed in operationalising WRDC’s systems and processes. All the specific recommendations have been fully followed up and implemented.
 
Centralise Command and Control

The COI made two specific recommendations on command and control in WRDC. The COI recommended that the Internal Security Department (ISD) assumes overall command and control of WRDC, and that ISD must clarify the responsibilities of all officers in WRDC as it is an ISD facility.
 
These recommendations have been implemented.
 
ISD has clearly defined the security responsibilities of ISD and the Gurkha Contingent (GC) in WRDC. ISD is in overall charge of WRDC operations, including all security matters, even as the GC continues to undertake the specific responsibility of guarding the complex. In particular, the WRDC Superintendent, who is an ISD officer, has oversight of the procedures and practices of the GC guards. 
 
Enhance Communication and Coordination
 
The COI made three specific recommendations on communication and coordination among the three functional groups in WRDC. These are the WRDC Administration, the GC guards and the ISD Operations Group which is in charge of investigations. The COI recommended that WRDC establishes a formal framework of communications among the three functional groups. It also recommended that WRDC establishes a more structured feedback mechanism. In addition, the COI recommended that WRDC develops a more structured framework to communicate risks posed by certain detainees to GC guards.
 
These recommendations have been implemented.
 
A formal framework of communications among the three functional groups has been established. Monthly meetings chaired by the WRDC Superintendent with the GC Detachment Commander and the Operations Group are held to share views and feedback, and to review procedures. This supplements the day-to-day direct communications among the officers. In addition, monthly meetings are held between the WRDC Administration and GC specifically on security issues, in particular to ensure that all security measures are operationalised effectively and to address any feedback. Quarterly meetings at the senior management level of both organisations are also held. WRDC has also developed a simple and clear detainee risk profile system to better communicate detainee risk to the GC guards.
 
Conduct Regular Ground Exercises and Security Audits
 
The COI made four specific recommendations on exercises, training and audits. The COI recommended that WRDC develops a robust response plan for major incidents and to hold exercises to validate the plans. On training, the COI recommended that WRDC develops a comprehensive training programme for WRDC staff and GC guards deployed at WRDC. On audits, the COI recommended that WRDC institutes a system of regular audits to ensure that instructions are carried out and procedures are adhered to. The COI also recommended that WRDC develops a system of checks and balances in WRDC.
 
These recommendations have been implemented.
 
Exercises are now institutionalised as part of WRDC’s operations. For example, in Sep 2008, WRDC conducted a table-top exercise with GC with regard to the operational response plans for major incidents. As a result of the exercise, relevant adjustments to the plans have been made. WRDC and the GC will continue to conduct regular exercises to hone response plans and procedures. A comprehensive training programme for all WRDC staff and GC guards has also been implemented.
 
Three levels of audits have been introduced into WRDC. Firstly, a new Security Section has been set up in WRDC. This Security Section conducts weekly audits of various processes, especially those involving detainees. Secondly, a separate ISD unit conducts independent monthly audits of WRDC. It will also conduct annual comprehensive security reviews of WRDC. The third level of audit is an external audit by the Prisons Department. In Dec 2008, the Prisons Department conducted its first audit. The Prisons Department will be submitting its findings directly to the Minister for Home Affairs.
 
The COI’s recommendation on checks and balances has been implemented in WRDC. For instance, no changes can now be made to audited Standard Operating Procedures without proper security assessment and approval by senior ISD management.
 
Design and Build a New Detention Facility in Changi Prison
 
The COI’s final specific recommendation is that a new Detention Centre be built and located in Changi Prison.
 
This recommendation is in progress.
 
In Jul 2008, ISD and the Prisons Department started a joint project to study the building of a new Detention Centre in Changi Prison. A series of meetings between both agencies has since been held to work out the details. The project is expected to be completed within five years.
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