SINGAPORE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT 2022
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The terrorism threat to Singapore remains high. There is currently no specific intelligence of an imminent terrorist attack against Singapore. With the relaxation of pandemic restrictions and resumption of cross-border travel, terrorist elements may become more active and revisit plots that had been put on hold.

Threats to Singapore

1. The threat from Islamist terrorist groups and their violent ideology persists.
   Their virtual network of supporters continues to disseminate propaganda, raise funds and plot attacks.

2. The spread of radical ideologies online has fuelled the self-radicalisation threat in Singapore.
   Since 2015, 45 self-radicalised individuals - comprising 33 Singaporeans and 12 foreigners - have been issued with Orders of Detention or Restriction Orders under the Internal Security Act.

3. Ongoing developments abroad, such as in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Ukraine, could also affect our security landscape.
   - Extremist elements can exploit such conflicts and tap on grievances to promote their radical narratives and recruit supporters.
   - We must maintain a zero tolerance approach to all forms of hate speech and extremist rhetoric.

Public Vigilance and Preparedness are Key Components of Our Defence Against Terrorism

Report signs of radicalisation or suspicious activities to the Internal Security Department (ISD) at 1800-2626-473.

Visit sgsecure.gov.sg to learn more about SGSecure or sign up as an SGSecure Responder.
OVERVIEW

The terrorism threat to Singapore remains high. On the external front, Islamist terrorist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) pose a persistent threat with their ability to radicalise and inspire attacks among their followers. On the domestic front, self-radicalisation through online means remains the primary concern. In April 2022, the Internal Security Department (ISD) detained a self-radicalised Singaporean under the Internal Security Act (ISA) who was influenced by the online teachings of foreign radical preachers.

2. As an open and globally connected society, developments abroad may also have repercussions on Singapore’s security landscape. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan could inspire regional Islamist militants to make their way there, while the war in Ukraine has galvanised far right extremist elements further afield. As COVID-19 travel restrictions ease and cross border travel resumes, we must stay vigilant to the possibility of a terrorist attack against Singapore or its interests overseas – be it by foreign terrorist elements or self-radicalised individuals here.

EXTERNAL TERRORISM THREAT

Continued Threat from ISIS

3. ISIS continues to pose a significant security threat globally despite its leadership and territorial losses in the core conflict zone. ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi died during a raid by US forces in February 2022, but ISIS announced a new leader “Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi” (Abu al-Hasan) the following month. The prompt appointment of Abu al-Hasan reflects ISIS’s deep leadership bench and operational resilience. Outside of its conflict zones, ISIS persists in its efforts to build its global footprint through its affiliates across the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

4. Following the withdrawal of US military forces and the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated, exacerbated by a humanitarian crisis. ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) is present in nearly all Afghan provinces, and ISIS-K militants have been linked to several terrorist attacks, including the suicide attack at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on 26 Aug 2021 that killed at least 183 people. There are concerns that ISIS-K may be able to reconstitute its ability to mount attacks outside of South and Central Asia within a year. ISIS-K aside, the infighting amongst the Taliban’s different factions will aggravate their efforts to stabilise the country and develop relationships with the international community. An unstable Afghanistan could evolve again into a breeding ground for militancy and a safe haven for the planning of terrorist attacks abroad, like what was seen with the
Soviet-Afghan conflict in the 1980s.¹ ISIS supporters in Southeast Asia could also be inspired to join ISIS-K in Afghanistan if it sees more battlefield successes.

5. Within Southeast Asia, ISIS affiliates are the primary driver of terrorism and pose the most immediate threat through their ability to mount ISIS-inspired attacks. Pro-ISIS militant factions in southern Philippines persistently engage security forces in insurgent-style armed clashes, while ISIS-aligned Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) elements in Indonesia have remained active in plotting attacks. Recent attacks by JAD militants often involved the use of readily available weapons such as knives, although some militant cells are assessed to retain bomb-making capabilities. In the past year, the number and scale of ISIS-linked or inspired terror attacks and plots in Southeast Asia has declined, largely due to strong counter-terrorism measures and COVID-19 travel restrictions. Given that travel restrictions around the world are being lifted, this lull is likely to be temporary.

6. More than 1,000 Southeast Asians have travelled to the Syria/Iraq conflict zone since the mid-2010s. At least 600 Southeast Asians reportedly remain in Syria – a significant number are women and children in detention camps. Despite the distance, these individuals pose a security concern to our region. Battle-hardened fighters could facilitate and direct attacks from abroad. In addition, female Southeast Asian ISIS supporters in detention camps have reportedly been actively promoting ISIS propaganda on social media and radicalising others back home. The detention camps are also incubators for the next generation of militants; the children are reportedly being indoctrinated in ISIS’s violent ideology, and some have been smuggled out of these camps to join ISIS as potential recruits.²

Regional online terror eco-system

7. In our region, ISIS’s violent ideology continues to resonate with radical Islamists, fuelled by a thriving pro-ISIS eco-system on social media. Autonomous media groups and ISIS supporters engage in “cyber jihad”, circulating official ISIS materials alongside self-produced propaganda. This facilitates the radicalisation and recruitment of a virtual “caliphate of believers” who remain loyal to ISIS,

¹ The Soviet-Afghan conflict (1979 – 1989) drew an estimated 10,000 foreign fighters which included several hundreds of Southeast Asians. Through their experience in Afghanistan, they developed links to Al-Qaeda (AQ) and formed a fraternity of mujahideen (fighters). Upon their return to Southeast Asia, they continued to pursue a path of violence by joining regional militant groups like the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). At least 11 former Singapore JI members had trained in AQ camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and several were involved in attack plots targeting Singapore upon their return. One of them had briefed AQ leaders in Afghanistan in 1999 on the plans to attack US military personnel at Yishun MRT station.

² In May 2022, the US government sanctioned a network of five Indonesian ISIS financial facilitators. The five reportedly collected funds in Indonesia and Turkey, and used them to smuggle children out of Syrian detention camps to join ISIS.
notwithstanding the group’s leadership losses and operational setbacks. ISIS’s announcement of its new leader in March 2022 had swiftly drawn pledges of allegiances from its supporters in Philippines and Indonesia.

8. This online eco-system also facilitates communication between regional supporters and ISIS Core in Syria and Iraq. In March 2022, Indonesian authorities arrested five members of a prolific self-styled pro-ISIS media group, who had allegedly received instructions from ISIS Core to translate propaganda materials into Bahasa Indonesia. While the communication lines appear to be informal and sporadic, such linkages have the potential to boost the operational capabilities of pro-ISIS groups in Philippines and Indonesia, including in directing and financing terror attacks in Southeast Asia.³

9. The online networks also enable like-minded individuals in the region to coordinate terror activities across physical borders and exchange operational expertise such as in weapons-making. As travel restrictions ease, online collaboration between extremists could manifest as real-world attacks. Consequently, the region faces a heightened risk of ISIS-inspired attacks conducted by home-grown extremists, acting alone or in small groups.

10. Regional terrorist elements have increasingly leveraged social media to raise funds. Often operating under the guise of seemingly legitimate non-profit organisations (NPOs), they solicit donations by tapping on public sympathy for the less fortunate, such as Muslim refugees overseas, and then channel some of these funds towards terror activities. In 2021, Indonesian authorities reportedly identified at least 181 terror-linked NPOs, many of them operating online.

**JI may revive ties with AQ**

11. In Indonesia, close to 180 JI-linked suspects were arrested in 2021, including several prominent ideologues and key members involved in the JI’s fundraising efforts. While JI is in a temporary state of retreat, it is resilient. Despite the ongoing crackdown, JI is expected to persist with its outreach activities – through its network of schools, mosques and NPOs – to raise funds,⁴ recruit new members and foster

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³ In September 2021, regional ISIS supporters circulated social media postings claiming that Indonesian ISIS militant Saefullah, who had plotted and financed attacks in the region whilst embedded with ISIS-Khorasan, remains alive and is aided by two deputies. One of these deputies is purportedly a Malaysian fighter who made an online post inciting Southeast Asian ISIS supporters to mount attacks in several regional countries, including Singapore. Investigations to date have not surfaced any indication of an imminent threat to Singapore.

⁴ The JI-linked NPOs are significant sources of funding for the group. In 2021, the Indonesian authorities disrupted two JI-linked NPOs, Syam Organizer and Abdurrahman bin Auf, which reportedly collected a total of around IDR 30 billion (about SGD 2.8 million) over a year.
ground support for its long-term objective of establishing an Islamic state in the region. To expand its influence, the JI has also attempted to infiltrate Indonesian political parties and mainstream Islamic organisations.\(^5\)

12. Indonesian authorities remain vigilant against the emergence of violent JI splinter factions impatient to conduct attacks in Indonesia. Some JI members who trained with AQ affiliates in Syria over the past decade remain at large in Indonesia. With the Taliban’s return to power, AQ could resurge in Afghanistan. There is no indication that the JI has already re-established operational ties with AQ, but it is likely that informal linkages exist, and any revival of operational ties would significantly increase the JI’s operational and attack planning capabilities.

**Emerging threat of far-right extremism**

13. In some Western countries, the threat from far-right extremism (FRE) has overshadowed that of Islamist terrorism. On 14 May 2022, an 18-year-old shot 13 people, in a supermarket in Buffalo, New York killing 10 of them. This incident echoed the shooting attack at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas in August 2019, where a 21-year-old killed 23 people. Both perpetrators were apparently inspired by Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant), the white supremacist who killed 51 worshippers in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019.\(^6\) Tarrant published his manifesto online prior to the attack, and livestreamed part of his attack on Facebook. FRE elements are known to embrace the gaming culture, using online shooting games as a channel for recruitment. In this manner, FRE narratives have crossed borders and developed traction amongst youths.

14. Globally, the Russian-Ukraine conflict may serve as a rallying point for FRE elements, who have shown an interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 amplified interest within online FRE communities, where the chatter appears dominated by the pro-Ukraine narrative. It has been reported that about 20,000 volunteers – likely including FRE elements – have responded to Ukraine’s invitation to join its international legion. Several Western countries have also contributed significant caches of weapons towards Ukraine’s defence. FRE-aligned

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\(^5\) Between November 2021 and February 2022, Indonesian authorities arrested at least three suspected JI members who were members of the Indonesia Ulema Council, the country’s top Muslim clerical body. Their investigations surfaced that a handful of JI members had been involved in two nascent political parties, Partai Ummat and Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia.

\(^6\) In December 2020, ISD detected Singapore’s first case involving an individual self-radicalised by FRE ideology. The 16-year-old Singaporean youth was also inspired by Tarrant, and had intended to conduct attacks at two mosques in Singapore.
foreign fighters and the proliferation of surplus weapons would be likely by-products of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine.

DOMESTIC THREAT SITUATION

Self-radicalisation threat persists

15. The self-radicalisation threat continues to be the primary driver of the domestic terrorism threat in Singapore. Since 2015, 45 self-radicalised individuals, comprising 33 Singaporeans and 12 foreigners have been issued with Orders under the ISA.

16. The latest case is 29-year-old Singaporean Radjev Lal Madan Lal (Radjev), who was detained under the ISA in April 2022. Radjev, a mover at a logistics company, was introduced to the online sermons of Imran Hosein (Imran) in 2013; Imran was a radical preacher from Trinidad and Tobago who preached about the supposed imminent "end of times" and the rise of a prophesised Muslim "Black Flag Army" (BFA) that would engage in battle with "non-believers". Over time, Radjev became deeply radicalised by the teachings of Imran and other foreign radical preachers. He came to believe he needed to partake in armed violence against "enemies of Islam" – he practised knifing techniques, and at the time of his arrest, was considering travelling to Afghanistan to join Taliban militants. Radjev also tried to recruit his family and friends, and created a social media group to propagate his ideologies to people online. While he did not have specific attack plans, Radjev admitted that he was willing to conduct an attack in Singapore or against Singapore's interests overseas, if instructed by Imran or the BFA.
17. The case of Radjev underscores the pervasiveness of terrorist and extremist ideologies online, including those propagated by foreign preachers and ideologues. It is thus important to maintain Singapore’s zero-tolerance approach towards extremist rhetoric and hate speech, and to inoculate the wider community against radical ideologies.

**Efforts to curb terrorism financing**

18. Singapore also takes a firm stance against terrorism financing-related activities. Introduced in 2002, the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act (TSOFA)\(^7\) criminalises the act of providing money for terrorist purposes, regardless of the amount involved. In the past 12 months, a Singaporean and a Bangladeshi were convicted for terrorism financing offences under TSOFA. These two cases bring the total number of individuals convicted under TSOFA to 13.\(^8\)

19. The Singaporean, Mohamed Kazali bin Salleh (Kazali), a businessman, had given a Malaysian man over S$1,000 in 2013 and 2014 to facilitate the latter’s journey to Syria to become a fighter for ISIS. In September 2021, Kazali was sentenced to three years and 10 months' imprisonment for his terrorism financing offences.

20. The Bangladeshi, Ahmed Faysal,\(^9\) had made fund transfers between February and October 2020 totalling about S$900 via online platforms, which he knew would benefit the terrorist entity Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in Syria. In February 2022, he was sentenced to two years and eight months' imprisonment for his terrorism financing offences.

**THREAT OUTLOOK**

21. While there is currently no specific nor credible intelligence of an imminent terrorist attack against Singapore, we have to stay alert to threats on the horizon. The transnational nature of terrorism means that developments further afield, such as those in the Middle East and Afghanistan, can reverberate much closer to home. Extremists are adept at opportunistically exploiting such overseas conflicts to promote

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\(^7\) TSOFA gives effect to Singapore’s obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which Singapore adopted in 2001.

\(^8\) The earlier cases are mentioned in para 39 of the Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2021 (published on 23 Jun 2021).

\(^9\) Ahmed Faysal came to Singapore to work as a construction worker in 2017. He became radicalised in 2018. He created multiple Facebook accounts to spread messages about jihad, and bought knives which he said were for carrying out attacks in Bangladesh. He was detained under the ISA in November 2020.
their radical narratives and recruit supporters by tapping on a diverse range of grievances.

22. Globally, the relaxation of pandemic restrictions and resumption of cross-border travel could also give rise to a surge in terrorist movement and activities. Foreign terrorist fighters may make their way to new conflict zones and hotspots, while radicalised individuals may put into action their attack plans conceived during the pandemic. Singapore continues to be featured on terrorist propaganda and is viewed as an attractive target for attack by both foreign terrorist groups and self-radicalised lone actors alike.

OUR RESPONSE MATTERS

23. ISD and Home Team agencies will continue to work together with other Government agencies and the community to keep Singapore safe and secure (see Annex A for details of our ongoing efforts to enhance our counter terrorism capabilities). Members of the public also play a critical role in countering terrorism through their preparedness and vigilance, such as by joining the SGSecure Responders’ Network. The first response of individuals at the scene of a terrorist attack is crucial. If they have been trained to respond, they would be better able to help those around them. More importantly, after an attack, the collective response by the community to denounce the attack and to support those affected would be fundamental to the recovery of our nation. Since its launch in 2016, the SGSecure movement has helped to mobilise the community in the fight against terror (see Annex B for various programmes of the SGSecure movement).

24. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) from March to May 2021 (see Annex C for details) found that the majority of respondents are aware of the terror threat and would keep a look-out for suspicious behaviours or items in a public place. Most believed that Singaporeans of different races and religions would stand united in the event of an attack in Singapore. However, fewer than half of the survey respondents indicated that they would contact the authorities if they believed that one of their loved ones displayed signs of radicalisation.

25. Time is of the essence when someone is already displaying signs of radicalisation. By alerting the authorities early, we can help the individual to receive timely help, guidance, and counselling. Anyone who knows or suspects that a person is radicalised should promptly contact the ISD Counter-Terrorism hotline 1800-2626-473 (1800-2626-ISD). The identity of the informer will be protected. When a report is made, authorities will carry out checks to ascertain the veracity of the report. In situations where there are no indications of radicalisation, no further action will be
taken against the individual(s). Where there is basis to suspect that the person may be radicalised, he/she may be referred for counselling and other mitigating measures.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to, the following:</th>
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<td>- frequently surfing radical websites;</td>
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<td>- posting/sharing extremist views on social media platforms, such as expressing support/admiration for terrorists/terrorist groups as well as the use of violence;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- sharing their extremist views with friends and relatives;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races or religions;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore; and/or</td>
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<tr>
<td>- inciting others to participate in acts of violence.</td>
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**CONCLUSION**

26. The global threat from terrorism and radicalisation persists. Singapore and Singaporeans are not immune. Our strongest defence is our collective vigilance, preparedness, resilience and unity, along with a zero-tolerance approach to those who seek to conduct or finance terrorist acts, or propagate extremist rhetoric to foment divisions within our community.

**INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT**

13 JULY 2022
GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITIES

The Government has taken significant steps to enhance our counter-terrorism capabilities.

Response and Investigative Capabilities

2. In 2021, the Police operationalised its Aerial Response Team (ART) of trained and certified drone pilots, to integrate the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into its operations. Drones have since been deployed to strengthen Police’s operations in areas of enforcement, crowd management and public safety, search and rescue, as well as aerial patrols. More drone pilots will be trained in 2022 as part of the progressive build-up of the ART.

3. Since its operationalisation in 2019, In-situ Reaction Teams (IRT) from Land Divisions have been deployed at high footfall and iconic locations to enhance the Police’s response to potential terror attacks. These officers have undergone tactical training and are equipped with higher firepower to allow them to respond more effectively.

4. To validate our operational plans and readiness, the Police conduct regular counter-terrorism exercises. This includes large scale exercises involving multiple agencies, to sharpen inter-agency coordination in dealing with a terrorism threat swiftly and effectively. The most recent large-scale exercise was conducted on 13 May 2022, involving more than 700 personnel across the Police, the Singapore Civil Defence Force, and the Singapore Armed Forces.

5. The Police have strengthened their collaboration with community stakeholders, in recognition of the vital role the community plays alongside the Home Team in safeguarding Singapore. The Protective Security Engagement Group (PSEG) was established in 2021 to provide stakeholders responsible for the security of premises with timely advisories on security-related matters and raise their level of preparedness against terrorist threats. In the past year, PSEG has been actively engaging these
stakeholders through briefings, joint patrols, and exercises to strengthen their vigilance and resilience of the premises.

6. To improve our sensemaking capability against crimes and security threats, the Police will be expanding their camera networks to more than 200,000 cameras by 2030. As at end-2021, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) had completed the installation of 79,300 cameras at 11,100 Housing & Development Board (HDB) blocks and multi-storey carparks. Beyond HDB blocks and carparks, SPF will also expand the cameras’ coverage to more public spaces such as town centres, hawker centres, parks, and roads.

**Border Security**

7. In view of the persistent global terror threat, the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) has enhanced security measures at the checkpoints and will continually review the effectiveness of these measures. Among these is the advance passenger screening (APS), which requires airlines to submit advance passenger information to the authority. Data analytics will be used to conduct pre-arrival risk assessments on foreign visitors using information gathered through the APS and their electronic arrival cards.

8. ICA will introduce the New Clearance Concept (NCC) from 2023 to provide a secure and seamless immigration clearance experience for all travellers through the use of iris and facial scans. The NCC will leverage advance arrival information and data analytics to allow all foreigners to use the automated immigration gates without prior enrolment. NCC will also allow residents and departing foreigners to undergo contactless immigration clearance without the need for them to present their passports and fingerprints.

9. ICA is also transforming the cargo clearance process with the NCC for Cargo to provide a more efficient cargo clearance experience for our industry partners (i.e. importers and transport companies), through greater use of automation and digitisation. It will use data analytics and artificial intelligence for better risk profiling of cargoes as well as strengthen capabilities to detect anomalies and prevent undesirable cargo from crossing our borders.

**MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS**
Members of the public have a critical role to play in countering terrorism. By reporting suspicious items or behaviours – including those of suspected radicalised individuals – they may help prevent a terrorist attack. In the event of an attack, individuals who have picked up emergency preparedness skills could serve as first responders to help others. It is also important that Singaporeans remain united as a community in the aftermath of an attack.

2. The SGSecure movement is Singapore’s community response to the threat of terror. Launched in 2016, SGSecure is the national movement to sensitise, train, and mobilise the community to play a part to prevent and deal with a terror attack.

Building Awareness

3. Together with our partner agencies, the Home Team implements a wide range of programmes for individuals and institutions across all segments of our community. These include:

   a. **SGSecure Roadshows**, which were put on hold since March 2020 due to the pandemic, have resumed in July 2022. Participants at these Roadshows will be able to learn about the terrorism threat and pick up emergency preparedness skills; they will also be able to participate in a simulated terror attack to put their knowledge and skills into action.
b. **SGSecure house visits** in HDB estates conducted by Home Team officers. More than 510,000 households have been engaged so far. The Home Team has also reached out to private estates through **“Safety and Security Day”** in condominiums.

c. **Talks and mobile exhibitions** held in schools to engage students about the terror threat and SGSecure. To date, these talks and exhibitions have been conducted at more than half of all our secondary schools and junior colleges.
d. The **SGSecure@Workplaces programme**, where seminars, webinars and outreach programmes were conducted to engage companies and employees on SGSecure. More than 4,300 companies from priority sectors (e.g. F&B, Retail and Hotel) have been engaged to date.

e. **Counter-terrorism briefings**, which have been conducted for more than 300 Religious Organisations in 2021. **Interfaith activities** involving more than 5,000 participants have been conducted to foster better appreciation of diverse religions and cultures, as well as to raise awareness and increase understanding of radicalism, extremism and terrorism.

**Raising Preparedness**

4. To raise our preparedness at the domain level, the Home Team and partner agencies work with various institutions to facilitate training in emergency preparedness skills, putting contingency plans in place, and conducting exercises to prepare for terror attack scenarios. To date:

   a. Over 7,500 residents and volunteers have gone through emergency preparedness skills training organised by the People’s Association. More than 38% of grassroots leaders are trained in and familiar with at least one emergency preparedness skill.

   b. The **SGSecure Guide for Workplaces** was launched in 2017 to help businesses prepare for the terror threat (and is available for download on MOM’s SGSecure@Workplaces webpage). Under this programme, table-top exercises were conducted with various companies and sector-specific SGSecure guides were developed.

   c. More than 65,000 businesses have appointed **SGSecure representatives**, who help to drive SGSecure programmes in their workplace during peacetime. They also serve as points of contact whom the authorities can reach out to during a terror attack. More than 27,000 companies are certified under the **enhanced bizSAFE framework**, and have incorporated terrorist attacks in their risk management plans.
d. It has not been tenable to hold lockdown drills in schools given the pandemic situation, but school leaders and members of the school emergency structures have conducted small-group table-top exercises and reviewed crisis response plans. School staff also made use of online training modules on school emergency preparedness to carry out self-directed learning. Secondary One students were taught CPR/AED skills, while student leaders in some uniformed groups are trained in CPR/AED and first aid.
Strengthening our Community Response

5. In times of crisis, strong networks and relationships will be needed for mobilising and coordinating crisis preparedness activities. Since its launch in November 2019, more than 100,000 people have signed up as SGSecure Responders. The SGSecure Responders’ Network serves as a pool of community responders who can be mobilised to help one another during crises, as well as peacetime emergencies.

6. Members of the public can sign up as an SGSecure Responder via the SGSecure app if they are willing to take up any of the following roles:

   a. “Staying Alert” – Report anything suspicious to the authorities early through the “Report” function in the SGSecure app.

   b. “Staying United” – In the event of a terror attack or security incident, keep calm and obtain the latest information from official sources, such as through the “Alert” function in the SGSecure app.

   c. “Staying Strong” – Timely response to nearby cases of cardiac arrest and minor fires. SGSecure Responders are encouraged to pick up skills inter alia in First Aid, CPR/AED and basic firefighting.
7. The **Community Response Roundtable (CRRT)** was also piloted in 2019, bringing representatives from schools, businesses, grassroots, religious, and other community groups within a geographical area to the same table. The CRRT seeks to strengthen cooperation across stakeholder groups to enhance local community-level emergency preparedness. There are currently thirteen CRRTs in 10 GRCs across Singapore, and there are plans to roll out more.

![Map of CRRTs set up across Singapore](image1)

![Photos of CRRT meetings (Source: People’s Association)](image2)

**Way Forward for the SGSecure Movement**

8. The SGSecure movement will continue to engage and enable the community to actively play a part in keeping ourselves and those around us safe from the terrorism threat. Further details can be found at sgsecure.gov.sg.
PUBLIC SURVEY ON THE TERRORIST THREAT AND SGSECURE

In 2021, the Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) conducted a national-level survey that sought to gauge public perception and sentiments towards the terrorism threat, and participation in emergency preparedness efforts as part of the SGSecure movement. A representative sample of 2,012 Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents (aged 15 years and above) were involved in the survey, which was conducted between March to May 2021 via a series of face-to-face interviews. Amongst the salient findings were that:

- 51% of respondents believe that Singapore is a target for terrorist attacks

- 88% agree that it is the collective responsibility of the Government, community and individual to counter terrorism.

- 67% agree that they were generally alert and would keep a lookout for suspicious behaviours or items when in a public place. However, less than half (about 2 in 5) would contact authorities if they believed that one of their loved ones (e.g. family, relative or friend) was displaying signs of radicalisation.

- 65% are familiar with or trained in emergency preparedness skills\textsuperscript{10}.

  87% believe that all Singaporeans will stand united regardless of race or religion should there be an attack in Singapore.

- 89% are also willing to help other Singaporeans affected by a terrorist attack in Singapore, and 75% believe that their neighbours will help them if they were affected.

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

\textsuperscript{10} These skills include performing CPR, using an AED, providing First Aid, Psychological First Aid/Counselling, operating a Fire Extinguisher, or managing/facilitating evacuation and lockdown scenarios during emergencies.