THE THREE KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF INNOVATION IN THE SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE

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ABSTRACT

The Singapore Police Force (SPF) has long invested heavily in its people and leveraged technology to reach its vision of "making Singapore the safest place in the world". As an organisation it benchmarks itself against the globally recognised Business Excellence Framework, for which it has won the Singapore Quality Award several times, including certification to its Innovation, People and Service classes since 2003-4, and the pinnacle award for sustained global leadership in policing in 2007 and 2019. These accolades are seen by the SPF leadership as health checks on the Force's continuing commitment to innovation as policing increases in complexity. This article describes the strong sense of purpose shared by SPF officers, the organisation's culture of innovation and its supportive and effective leadership – three factors the SPF considers key to its success in achieving its mission.

INNOVATION IN POLICING

When the Singapore Police Force (SPF) won the country's top internationally benchmarked business excellence award, the Singapore Quality Award (SQA) with Special Commendation, for the second time in 2019, Commissioner of Police Hoong Wee Teck said: "What is effective today is not good enough for tomorrow. We have to continue to learn, innovate and transform to future-proof ourselves. … The Business Excellence Framework is one of the means which we adopt to conduct an organisational health check" (Kan, 2019).

The SPF was among the first public service organisations in Singapore to adopt the Business Excellence framework when it was introduced by Enterprise Singapore in 1994 to help organisations strengthen their management systems and processes to deliver superior performance.[1] The first government department to win the SQA in 2002, the SPF and its leaders saw the Business Excellence framework, with its nine attributes of excellence – leading with vision and integrity, creating value for customers, driving innovation and productivity, developing organisational capability, valuing people and partners, managing with agility, sustaining outstanding results, adopting an integrated perspective, and anticipating the future – as aligned with its vision of being "A Force for the Nation – Making Singapore the Safest Place in the World".

Seeking out best practices from around the world and developing innovative and practical ideas to fight crime has always been integral to policing.

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[1] Enterprise Singapore concluded its programme of recognising organisations that meet the robust standards of the Business Enterprise Framework with annual awards, namely Singapore Quality Award (SQA), People Excellence Award, Innovation Excellence Award and Service Excellence Award and the pinnacle SQA with Special Commendation, in 2019. The Business Enterprise Initiative was closed in 2020 as it had "achieved its intent in instilling excellence among organisations", having certified over 2000 organisations in 25 years (Enterprise Singapore, 2020).

For instance, the SPF embarked on a radical transformation in the 1980s when it introduced community policing[2].

Incremental changes are as important. Policing work involves problem solving which requires officers to adopt an inquisitive and innovative mindset with the ability to think on their feet. Investigation officers often have to engage in lateral thinking to gather evidence and solve crime cases. Ground Response Force officers have to be creative to effectively manage and resolve incidents every day. Community Policing officers constantly consider new ideas when engaging the community and stakeholders to solve community safety and security problems. Problem solving is a core component of effective policing efforts and the skill sets and tools to resolve issues have to be integrated into daily work. In its 200 years[3] of keeping Singapore safe, the SPF has worked hard to make innovation part of the SPF DNA, where officers are always encouraged to make changes, however small or simple, to improve and address problems in their workplace.

THREE KEY SUCCESS FACTORS

Innovation in the SPF refers to the creation or improvement of products, processes or services that add value to officers and stakeholders. It is not just limited to the creation of new products. Given that the SPF's primary stakeholders are members of the public, there are always broader implications to everything it does. In an increasingly complex world, innovation is more critical than ever to navigate, adapt and emerge stronger, especially during a global pandemic such as the COVID-19 outbreak that has claimed the lives of more than two million people worldwide in one year.

It is easy and convenient for organisations to be caught up in running day-to-day operations and undermine the importance of emphasising innovation, especially when existing processes and models have worked thus far and are still working well for them (Tan, P. 2020). For the SPF, the innovation journey has been a continuous process. Deliberate actions from all directions and at all levels have helped improve the way it works. This has been made possible by three key success factors: a sense of shared purpose, a culture of innovation, and effective and supportive leadership.

A STRONG SENSE OF PURPOSE

In every organisation, the most valuable and intangible resource is its people. A company is only as good as the people it keeps (Walter, 2013). Similarly, for the SPF, its officers are integral to its success in keeping crime rates among the lowest in the world. It is this sense of purpose, of making Singapore safe and secure for all, that acts as the guiding force to innovate, and empowers the SPF to progress in the different aspects of policing work.

Research has shown that a strong sense of purpose drives employee satisfaction and affects an organisation's ability to transform (Rohman, 2020). With millennials in particular, making a difference is often more important than professional recognition or a pay raise (Raza, 2016).

An organisation without purpose manages people and resources, while an organisation with purpose mobilises people and resources (Hakimi, 2015).

The nature of work in the SPF is rigorous and dynamic. There is no typical or routine day, as the tempo changes very quickly. It is challenging, yet one of the best ways to make a difference to people's lives. Not everyone is suited to policing work, which requires tenacity when dealing with suspects, but demands empathy and the ability to be sensitive when interacting with victims of crime (Leow, 2020). Officers in the SPF are expected to uphold the core values of Courage, Loyalty, Integrity and Fairness and remain dedicated to the mission of keeping Singapore safe and secure. They continue to strive because of their strong sense of shared purpose that ties them to the SPF, which binds all sorts of different people.

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[2] Community policing is one of the key thrusts of the SPF's policing strategy to actively involve the community in combating crime and terrorism. From the Neighbourhood Police Post (NPP) to the current Community Policing System (COPS), the community policing models have changed over the decades to adapt to an ever-changing security environment.
[3] The origins of the SPF can be traced to Sir Stamford Raffles' founding of Singapore as a British trading post where the police force was first formed with just 12 men in May 1820.

It is generally believed that the younger generation are more creative, that the longer an employee stays in a job, the higher probability that they will be more resistant to change. Innovation in the SPF has, on the contrary, stem from all age groups. While there are various recognition programmes to encourage and inspire officers, most put in the effort to innovate for the simple extrinsic reason that it will bring about some benefit to people, processes and reinforce the purpose of their work.

The Rangers, a project team from the SPF Training Command, is an example of three officers in their late 40s to 50s who came forward to embark on an innovation project in 2019. The team, comprising firearm instructors, trains and conducts weapons firing sessions for officers daily. After every session, all spent casings from every firearm have to be accounted for by the officers and trainers. As the spent casings are prone to bounce off surfaces in the range, the process of searching and accounting for the spent casings can be time-consuming. There were occasions when more than half an hour would be spent finding the last spent casing hidden between the small gaps of the targetry system. This search for spent casings often delays sessions and affects the schedules of officers and trainers.

The team of instructors came together to brainstorm solutions. They bought several materials, including bubble wrap and crates of boxes, to create different prototypes and tested them during their lunchtime breaks. Their early prototypes were not successful, until one day when the fibre nets from a badminton match inspired Senior Station Inspector Abdul Samad Bin Ab Jalil to share an idea with the team, which was quickly implemented. Since then, with fibre nets installed as deflectors in all the ranges at the Home Team Academy, officers involved in firing sessions have collectively saved more than 800 hours per month – the time they used to expend searching for stray spent casings.

Mrs Cheok-Goh Geok Leng, also in her 50s, is another example. After more than 36 years in the Administration and Finance Department, she picked up Robotic Process Automation (RPA) and coding skills to automate her work processes. She attended a two-day training programme and workshop that taught her

to conceptualise and develop her own bots. Although adept at Microsoft Excel, she initially struggled with RPA, but persisted, and has since July 2019 developed four bots that automate the generation of finance reports, journal analysis and file mergers for budget analysis in the SPF.

The work in the SPF may not always be directly related to fighting crime. However, officers understand the meaning behind their work and seek to improve their work environment because of their sense of belonging in the workplace. Organisational health surveys conducted within the SPF have consistently shown that most officers feel that the work they do is meaningful. It is this sense of purpose officers feel that have led them to continuously take ownership of their work and maintain a strong spirit of innovation.

A CULTURE OF INNOVATION

Building a culture does not take place overnight. It is a by-product of many different factors put together to create the desired conditions and environment.

The SPF recognises that structure can influence mindsets and facilitate changes in the ideal direction. It has since been shaping the innovation culture through the innovation framework that has been established and periodically reviewed to strategise and keep up with changing times. The SPF Innovation Framework, as illustrated in Figure 1, is a systematic approach to understanding problems, generating, evaluating and realising innovative ideas. Innovation in the SPF is guided by three key drivers, namely the Leadership Group (LG) steering innovation through platforms like forums and innovation meetings, collaborations with partners who provide their expertise, and officers undertaking projects to seek better ways of doing things. This is supported by innovations resources like dedicated funds and training interventions to equip officers with skillsets and tools to be competent in identifying problems and coming up with solutions to tackle them in a holistic manner. Having focused on innovation since the early days has also built the foundation of a culture of innovation in the SPF which empowers officers to constantly make improvement in the workplace. The combination of drivers and enablers has shaped the innovation process for the SPF to achieve its five

Innovation Framework

SPF INNOVATION MESSAGE: THERE WILL ALWAYS BE BETTER WAYS OF DOING THINGS
GUIDED BY SPF MISSION TO PREVENT, DETER AND DETECT CRIME

Drivers

SPF Leadership Group → Partnership → Officers

Infrastructure → People Development → Innovation Culture

Innovation Process: Idea Generation → Idea Evaluation → Idea Realisation

Enablers

Realising Desired Outcomes

5 Strategic Thrusts
- Being a Smart Force
- Tiered and Differentiated Approach
- Maximising People Potential
- Equipping Officers to Succeed
- Adopt a Community-Centric Approach

Innovation in SPF refers to the creation or improvement of products, processes or services that add value to our officers and stakeholders

Figure 1. The SPF Innovation Framework

desired outcomes through its five strategic thrusts – leveraging technology and building new capabilities to be a smart force, re-inventing work processes for greater resource optimisation through a tiered and differentiated approach, adopting a community-centric approach to better engage and deliver more convenient and meaningful services, strengthening and maximising the officers' potential and lastly, equipping officers to succeed.

Ideas in the SPF are generated both top-down and bottom-up, and externally from scans and collaboration with partners. As long as an idea creates value, it is considered because the smallest and simplest idea can sometimes be very effective and impactful.

The SPF's innovation culture is also tied very closely to being a pioneer adopter of the Learning Organisation concept of building a culture that supports learning and innovation (Senge, 2006). As a Learning Organisation, the SPF encourages independent thinking and empowers officers to seek better ways of doing things. There are platforms created that allow the opportunity for shared learning, cross-functional feedback and collaboration with each other. One of the most recent

platforms that has seen over 71 innovation projects during a four-month period from December 2019 to March 2020 is the Lunch & Learn – the innovation series. Lunch & Learn in the SPF provides innovation project teams with the opportunity to present their innovation ideas to officers from different units and staff authorities in their respective domains, and obtain feedback. Through this platform, there is always something new to learn, whether from the work or personal perspective, as officers also share their own learning experiences and the challenges that they have had to overcome. For instance, at one of the Lunch & Learn sessions, project members of the Anti-Assault Retractable Shield (A.R.T.S) from the Protective Security Command shared their learning journey. Having no prior mechanical or engineering background, the project team spent weeks researching online, watching YouTube videos and experimenting with various materials to build from scratch a customised shield to suit their operating environment. Officers at the session said later that they were inspired by the project team's perseverance and passion.

The journey towards a successful innovation product or process is not always comfortable. It is also not always immediately successful. There

are sometimes days of hair-pulling, frustration and trial and error, before the light at the end of the tunnel appears. Even a failure should be celebrated because of the learning outcomes and experiences that it brings about. This is something that the SPF acknowledges and puts into practice to cultivate a psychologically safe environment for officers to trial their ideas. This threshold for failure and celebration of officers daring to try are what push officers to keep striving for excellence.

Superintendent of Police (Supt) Victor Loo is one such role model who has displayed enthusiasm and passion for making improvements within his workplace. He strongly believes that "innovation is never a destination, but a journey of discovery". Since 2006, he has proactively embarked on more than ten innovation projects. One of the projects he has led is the Internal Communications Management System (ICMS). ICMS is a project that improves internal communications within Jurong Police Division. It leverages technology to provide officers with the most updated information and saves manhours previously expended on putting up manual communication messages. This simple application of existing technology was first sparked when Supt Loo saw commercial shops using such methods for their promotions and sales. He saw it as an opportunity and immediately brought together a team of officers to work on ICMS, which won the Gold award at the national-level Team Excellence Assessment 2019 organised by the Singapore Productivity Association.

While some of his ideas came to fruition, there were other projects and experiments that did not work. Supt Loo did not let failures get to him. He learnt from the experiences, took the feedback and saw each as an opportunity to grow and come back even stronger with every new project. His passion for innovation has been recognised. He has won several innovation awards, including the PS21 Best Ideator Award in 2010 and the Platinum Award under the Champion Category in the Home Team Innovation Awards 2020. These are apex awards that recognise innovative individuals across the Public Sector and Home Team respectively.

Product Innovations

The COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in early 2020 also put the innovation culture of the SPF to the test, especially given the Force's emphasis on deployment of smart technology. The SPF has responded to the crisis by adapting existing technology tools to enhance its operational effectiveness. The deployment of autonomous police robots and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are examples of such technology tools that help to augment police operations while helping to reduce exposure of frontline officers, keeping them safe.

For example, the Multi-purpose All Terrain Autonomous Robot 2.0 (M.A.T.A.R 2.0) is a home-grown robot developed in collaboration with the Home Team Science and Technology Agency (HTX) and A*Star. Since its first deployment in 2017, the robot has undergone several iterative trials and enhancements, evolving into M.A.T.A.R 3.0 with two variations – one with a Pan-Tilt-Zoom Camera, and the other equipped with a tethered UAV. Both versions allow real-time footage to be live-streamed to the police command centres to aid in sense-making.

With its ability to patrol and navigate routes without supervision, M.A.T.A.R 3.0 is playing an important role in the national response to the pandemic, complementing police officers patrolling the ground. As it is able to perform automated routine tasks, M.A.T.A.R 3.0 has been used to project police presence and was deployed at high risk environments like the COVID-19 isolation facilities (see Figure 2). Its communication feature also means it can remind occupants to adhere to the safe distancing measures (Shah, 2020).

Since the first deployment of UAVs in 2016, the SPF has been exploring the adoption of the latest technologies in its journey to become a smart

Figure 2. M.A.T.A.R 3.0 patrolling the grounds of a COVID-19 isolation facility

Figure 3. An officer with the customised 3D printed mask ear-guard

force. To support dormitory operations during COVID-19, UAVs have been deployed to conduct aerial surveillance of dormitory perimeters. They have helped to detect anomalies within dormitory compounds and enabled the SPF to coordinate responses to better manage situations (Shah, 2020).

Another area that the SPF has been exploring is 3D printing technology, which is also known as addictive manufacturing. This technology is becoming one of the fastest and cheapest ways to create products because of its affordability and the speed at which it can achieve production.

With mask wearing mandatory outside the home during COVID-19, discomfort from prolonged wearing and securing loose-fitting masks has become an issue for many. In early April 2020, when a team from Tanglin Police Division saw a mask ear-guard designed by a 13-year-old Canadian boy scout that secures masks and relieves pain on the ears from prolonged wearing, they decided to customise it to fit the average Asian head. Using the original design uploaded online, they introduced a curved design conformed to the head contour and with more prongs for customisability. The ear-guards were printed and trialled for use within three days, and later printed in larger numbers for distribution to all the officers in Tanglin Police Division. This low-cost and fast production of the 3D printed mask ear-guards was simple, yet for officers working long hours on the frontline, effective (Figure 3).

Process Innovations

Safe distancing measures have also called for changes in work processes and training while maintaining the same standard of service provided to both internal and external stakeholders.

The Police Smartphone, introduced in 2018, has become pivotal in aiding these process changes, particularly in the exchange of information for training. Designed with a host of custom-built applications, the Police Smartphone allows officers across different units to be more effective in their work. Some of its functions include secured messaging, access to SPF's knowledge management database on-the-go, and sharing of the latest information or training materials through the "Share-It" application.

Even in a pandemic, training remains essential as officers have to be equipped with the latest policy changes and knowledge. With Home-Based-Learning now the norm, there is a need to ensure that officers still have access to relevant information and materials while remaining in a safe environment. Instead of the usual face-to-face training, trainers now leverage the "Share-It" application in the Police Smartphone to disseminate training materials. Trainers have also converted their training materials to simple videos and animations to help officers understand and learn better. As part of the validation of the learning, quizzes are also prepared and uploaded onto the same platform to provide officers with a more seamless experience. This change in process has been made possible with the Police Smartphone as not all officers are equipped with a laptop, but all are equipped with the phone.

With the stepping up of enforcement efforts to ensure safe distancing, SPF has also received calls on related cases. A team of officers from Ang Mo Kio Police Division had earlier designed and

developed a mobile application called F-Connect that allows officers to obtain, literally at their fingertips, relevant contact details of agencies like the Housing and Development Board, and Health Sciences Authority, and individuals like locksmiths. As the Whole-Of-Government response to the pandemic grew, the team enhanced the application to include additional contact details of agencies responsible for different aspects. This quick change helps officers from the Ang Mo Kio Police Division inform relevant agencies of COVID-19 related cases within three clicks of their Police Smartphone. This is a vast improvement from the previous process whereby officers had to rely on the Police Operations Command Centre (POCC) or even trawl through the internet for the information.

In the area of investigations, the SPF also worked with external stakeholders to adopt new processes to ensure that investigation processes comply with the need to minimise interpersonal contact during COVID-19. The SPF worked with the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) on a media file sharing platform where Investigation Officers (IOs) no longer need to physically dispatch DVDs containing media evidence to the AGC. Instead, they can upload the media evidence to the platform and Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs) are also able to access the media evidence seamlessly through their work computers. The operationalisation of the media file sharing platform has facilitated telecommuting arrangements for both IOs and DPPs and reduced manual processes which might put both parties at risk of viral infection. It is also a substantive step towards digitalisation of the investigation process.

EFFECTIVE AND SUPPORTIVE LEADERSHIP

The third ingredient for the SPF's successful innovation journey is effective leadership. This is a necessary requirement; having purposefully driven officers and an innovative culture without effective leadership is like attempting to construct a building with resources, but no foundation to stabilise and maintain the structure (Fisher, 2018).

Leaders play a very crucial role. They set the tone and culture, create and plan, secure and work within resources, motivate employees to work together, and guide them towards achieving a specific goal (Ramos, 2020). Leaders work with the employees, even when the odds are against them. Leadership,

it can be said, is a process of social influence which maximises the efforts of others towards the achievement of a greater good (Ramos, 2020).

In the SPF, the LG adopts a Collective Leadership model which underscores collective ownership at the strategic level. At every opportunity and in every area, the SPF identifies members of its LG as drivers of excellence. Innovation, for instance, is driven by the Director of the Planning & Organisation (P&O) who, as the Innovation Champion, oversees and ensures that key decisions and deliberations are documented and acted upon. The role of the Innovation Champion is also to make innovation thrive within the SPF. Accordingly, the Director of P&O participates directly in platforms that allow him to connect with and understand better the needs of the officers, which is beneficial for deriving strategies to be used. This act of walking the ground also helps to gauge true sentiments and build rapport.

At the unit level, the Deputy Director or Deputy Commander are appointed Innovation Advocates. They are essential change agents who help to bridge strategic directions with ground-up innovations, thus enhancing an individual project's potential and value. At the same time, they help in communicating changes, managing challenges and being a mentor to the unit officers.

Together, the Innovation Champion and Innovation Advocates form a strong pillar of support and serve as role models for officers. They also ensure that effective and relatable communication is used in various channels and platforms to maintain healthy and lasting working relationships. These means using trendy, personalised contents in bite sizes in Electronic Direct Mails, Workplace by Facebook, dialogue sessions and townhalls, the idea being to engage and reach out to as many as possible within the SPF.

Innovate@Foxtrot (iF) is an example of what a unit with a strong innovation culture can produce. Started in January 2019 in the Ang Mo Kio Police Division by its then Commander as Digitalisation@Foxtrot, iF seeks to digitally transform the workplace and processes from the ground-up. The aim is to achieve better outcomes efficiently with the adoption of the lean start-up process. The lean start-up is a methodology that favours experimentation over elaborate planning, customer

feedback over intuition, and iterative design over traditional "big design up front" development (Blank, 2013). iF consists of passionate officers who volunteer to join the effort, united by the common goal of making a difference. Within iF, officers are organised into different domains based on their interests and skillsets.

As part of their training, iF officers learn about the lean start-up methodology and participate in learning visits to comprehend the qualities of the innovative spirit and best practices from different organisations. They are also given the opportunity to attend their preferred courses to upgrade their skillsets. These new skillsets and knowledge become relevant when they have to tackle problems in their respective domains. Since the start of iF, three projects have been implemented within Ang Mo Kio Police Division, including the F-Connect application described earlier, which has received positive feedback from other officers.

The unique trait of the iF is the strong support of the unit leaders, who act as role models focused on achieving real impact with speed. At the inception of iF, the then unit leaders participated in the learning visits with their officers to upskill together. They guided officers during the weekly meetings and introduced the 10-weeks rule where the entire process from formulating the problem statement to coming up with a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) – a product with enough features to be usable and receive feedback – must be completed within 10 weeks. Officers have since been encouraged to come up with simple MVPs, which can even be in the form of sketches on pieces of paper. This is part of the process to swiftly tackle problems to identify the feasibility

of ideas, without the extensive use of resources. The level of commitment and willingness to challenge the status quo by the leaders of Ang Mo Kio Police Division are reasons for the success of the iF in cultivating a psychologically safe innovation culture.

Since the sharing of iF at an internal platform, other units like Central Police Division and Tanglin Police Division have been inspired by their success to start similar initiatives to empower their officers and create a unique identity and innovation culture. iF continues to inspire and empower officers within the Ang Mo Kio Police Division as the team has grown from 25 to 61 officers within one year. They are currently working on 25 projects.

STAYING AHEAD, RELEVANT AND FUTURE-READY

With an increasingly diverse socio-political landscape, augmented by the potential of information exchange in cyberspace for misinformation, polarisation and dissent, the breadth and depth of public expectations of the SPF have increased and will continue to increase. But one thing remains certain, as organisations apply the lessons learnt to build resilience, they have to readily transform and innovate to adapt to paradigm shifts (Higgins & Bianzino, 2020). The relevance and success of the SPF depends on its most valued assets, its people. Similarly, the factors for SPF's continued success in its innovation journey are centred on its people – their strong sense of shared purpose, embraced a culture of innovation, and the support of effective leaders.

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INDIAN POLICE & ITS INVOLVEMENT IN INTELLIGENCE:
HISTORY AND CURRENT CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

The Indian police service has a long tradition of being used for various non-police duties. Intelligence collection was formally added to a growing list of municipal duties after the 1857 military uprising. Although many observers complained then that the East India Company had failed to feel the pulse of the Indian people and had destroyed the "native authority" by not respecting India's religious rights and customs, the then British government decided to entrust the subtle responsibility of internal intelligence to the Indian police in December 1887 with the formation of the Indian Intelligence Bureau. This wrong model was followed even after Indian independence and not changed when in most other democratic countries, separate agencies were set up to deal with domestic and foreign intelligence, internal security and counter-intelligence. The Intelligence Bureau may be the oldest such organisation in the world, but its historical law and order orientation, entrenched by a staffing policy of recruiting the senior echelons only from the police, continues to contribute to India's intelligence problems. This pattern is adopted in Indian foreign intelligence too. This essay is adapted from a forthcoming book by the author, a retired senior Indian intelligence officer, titled *Intelligence Over Centuries: From Canaan (13th Century BC) To Galwan (21st Century AD) – Achievements and Failures.*

THE WELL-SPRING OF INDIAN INTELLIGENCE (AND FAILURES)

Kargil, 26/11, Pulwama, Galwan – were these intelligence failures by India's intelligence agencies? Could prior intelligence have prevented the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan, the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the 2019 suicide bombing of a military convoy in Pulwama, the 2020 Galwan Valley clash with Chinese troops? The Indian public believes these crises to be failures on the part of the country's intelligence agencies because this is what various official and unofficial inquiries concluded. It would be more accurate, however, to describe these tragic incidents as failures of intelligence management. This is because security intelligence is generated on parallel tracks by major central agencies, including military intelligence, as well as various units run by customs, state police, and paramilitary outfits. Raw intelligence becomes

policy for action only after an alchemical process of collation, analysis, dissemination, arbitration, policy adjudication, and decision-making. Gaps in information are plugged by 'arbitration', whereby the merit of each intelligence input is carefully assessed, and a further collection process is set in motion. The final position is then presented to the decision makers for action. Any inter-space in this process will lead to a situation in which intelligence, including technical pointers already available in some form with some wing of the government, does not result in policy or action. This leads to an impression of 'intelligence failure' (Balachandran, 2020).

In researching the history of intelligence achievements and failures in India, I have come to the conclusion that Indian Central intelligence management and its local application failed key tests such as 26/11 and Pulwama[1] because the wrong model was adopted when the Indian

Intelligence Bureau was set up in 1887 as a responsibility of the Indian Police, and never corrected. This goes back to the long tradition of using the police for various non-police duties because the ruling class, except perhaps during the Maurya empire (321- 185 BC), did not have any other civil arm for coercive enforcement. British colonial rule not only followed tradition, it also entrenched it; 21 extra responsibilities including municipal duties were assigned to the police when the first police law was codified in 1861. This practice was continued after Indian independence in 1947 by the Indian states. Fourteen non-police responsibilities like health and municipal duties were entrusted to the police in Bombay State in 1951.

At the same time, unlike the "Bobby" system in Britain where the police were required to gain the confidence of the community, Indian police assumed a military colour and distanced itself from the local public when the East India Company introduced the Irish Constabulary model in 1843. The British Government confirmed this model when it took over administration after the 1857 military uprising in India. The British House of Commons debates on this uprising saw many voices complaining that the Company had failed to feel the pulse of the Indian people. Benjamin Disraeli, then Opposition member, blamed the East India Company for destroying the "native authority" by not respecting India's religious rights and customs. It was expected that Whitehall would entrust the subtle responsibility of internal intelligence to some other agency than the police who were engaged in suppressing freedom movements in India. Unfortunately, Whitehall approved the proposal of the Indian Viceroy to entrust this responsibility to the Police on 23 December 1887, which led to the formation of the Indian Intelligence Bureau.

This model was followed after Indian independence and even when most other democratic countries later moved towards having separate agencies deal with domestic and foreign intelligence, internal security and counter-intelligence, it was only later that a new staffing policy for foreign intelligence, based on the models of the MI6 in the United Kingdom, and the CIA in the United States, was tried out successfully. However even this is changing, affecting the quality of intelligence with its law and order orientation as set up by its former colonial government, and recruited almost exclusively from the Indian Police Service.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICING IN ANCIENT INDIA

Early Vedic literature (1500-1200 BCE) refers to "Rajan" (tribal chief) who was expected to employ "Spasu" (spies) to keep watch over enemies and the conduct of his people, who were punished when they did wrong. It mentions "Sendni", leader of the army ("send"), foot soldiers known as "Patti" and warriors known as "Rathins", who used chariots for battle. But there is no mention of the police. Later Vedic literature talks about "Jivagrib" in Rig Veda and "Ugras" in Upanishads, who could be police officials reporting to a village official called "Adhikrita" (Majumdar & Dutta, 1985). Their duties presumably included enforcing laws such as the Code of Manu (1250 BCE) which prescribed severe punishments like mutilation for breaches of the law (Shah,1993).

During the Maurya period (321-185 BC), "Prasasta" was the police chief. References were also found in the Ashoka period to "Pradeshata" who combined police and magisterial powers (Kumar, 2012). It was not very clear whether spies were under these police chiefs. In some documents, the designation of "Mahamatyapasarpa" was used to refer to the official in charge of the spies.

Some have described the Maurya empire as a "police state" because police responsibilities, including secret duties, were performed by many other departments. Chanakya (also known as Kautilya), the ancient Indian teacher and advisor to the first Mauryan emperor and his son, referred in his political treatise, the Arthashastra, to different types of spies: "idlers" who appeared

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[1]Prior to the 26/11 attacks, the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the National Security Council had the opportunity to pull up the Maharashtra government for not taking preventive steps even after initiating 16 advance intelligence alerts. In the case of the Pulwama bombing, the Central Reserve Police Force and local police were grossly negligent (as was the local Intelligence Bureau) in organising the long convoy without adequate protection when IB had already issued several threat alerts.

as vagabonds, astrologers and palmists who were able to gain the confidence of people; nurses, cooks, prostitutes and mendicants who would have access to different levels. They were all paid from the government treasury. Despite such widespread spying, care was taken not to interfere with the normal lives of law-abiding citizens. Great importance was paid to the security of the king. There were separate judges for civil infringements, and police magistrates (Shah,1993).

As eminent British historian Vincent Arthur Smith noted in 1907: "The Government relied on a highly organized system of espionage, pervading every department of the administration and every class of the population…. The courtesans, indeed, were regarded as court officials…. Cipher writing was used by the spies and carrier pigeons were employed to carry secret intelligence. The Intelligence Department was controlled by five 'Institutes of Espionage' in which the reports were checked and verified."

Some historians have held that the decline of the Maurya empire started during the later period of Ashoka the Great's reign when his idealism, non-violence and internationalism interfered with strict domestic vigilance. The army and intelligence system stagnated, leading to domestic strife and external interference (Shah, 1993).

In time, rural policemen in villages became part of the traditional service provided, like barbers or musicians, except that they were compensated with land grants. There are records to show that police were also used to intimidate the public by surveillance. This is evident from some orders issued to the police by the kings to exempt Brahmins and scholars from their surveillance visits (Sharma, 2006).

John Mathai, independent India's second Finance Minister who wrote an illuminating book for the London School of Economics in 1915 on the management of traditional Indian villages, described the village headman's role as administering the village, settling disputes, assisting the police and collecting revenue. He also described two types of watchmen: The duty of the "superior watchmen" was to gather information on crimes and to escort persons travelling from one village to another, while the "inferior watchmen" guarded the crops and performed other services. Village policing had been given primary importance going as far back as the Chola period in the 3rd Century BC, but these village policemen never enjoyed respect. Mathai wrote: "In the ancient village community, the headman had the principal direction of the arrangements for watch and ward. His chief executive assistant was the village watchman, who stood to him practically in the relation of a personal servant. As a rule, he was one of the menial castes, often given to criminal habits, who lived on the outskirts of the village and performed general service for the community…. [including] the sanitary duties which he discharged in addition to his police functions."

This led to corruption of the village police. The *Arthashastra* revealed that even during the Maurya period, wild tribes known as *Aranyachara* were used to protect the interior of the kingdom (Mathai, 1915). When the Mughuls came to power in the 16th century, they introduced no new arrangements for the prevention and detection of crime, which "remained, as from times immemorial, under the headman of the village and his subordinate watchmen". In the cities and towns, however, all policing was the responsibility of the chief they called Kotwal and his staff. Emperor Akbar also added intelligence collection to his duties. *Ain-i-Akbari*, a 16th century document of his rule, lists eight duties for the Kotwal, including "employing spies from among vagabonds to gather information about the affairs of neighbouring villages and the income and expenditure of the various classes of people" (Majumdar & Dutta, 1985).

In the rural areas, the practice of using criminal tribes to augment village policemen in maintaining security continued during the Maratha period (1674-1772). Individual villagers too began engaging robbers to secure them against outside criminals, especially during political upheavals in the 17th and 18th centuries.

When the British East India Company gained control of practically the whole of India after the 3rd Anglo-Maratha War in 1818, their administrators adopted the Maratha system of administration. Police corruption became rampant. Legendary "Thug hunter" William Henry Sleeman described in 1893 how the Thanadars

(Station House Officers) worked in princely states: "It is a common practice with Thānadārs all over the country to connive at the residence within their jurisdiction of gangs of robbers, on the condition that they shall not rob within those limits, and shall give them a share of what they bring back from their distant expeditions."

POLICING DURING BRITISH RULE (1818-1947)

The *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (1909) wrote that while the Mughuls made no change in the system of village police, "the duty of supervising them was entrusted to the revenue officers, who were also magistrates" (Meyer, 1909). This, the 1902-03 Police Commission concluded, was why the indigenous police system that was derived from the days of Emperor Akbar was not able to secure public peace and enable proper investigation or to suppress crime. The Commission added that the Indian police system was very similar to that of Saxon England: both were organized on the basis of land tenure.

Just as King Alfred's *Thane* (a noble warrior who wore a chain mail like a medieval knight) was required to produce the offender or to satisfy the claim, so the Zamindar in India was bound to apprehend all disturbers of public peace and to restore the stolen property or make good its value. Over the years the system became very corrupt. "Both village watchmen and the heads of villages, and even the higher officials connived at crime and harboured offenders in return for a share of the booty." However the changes introduced by the British – replacing Zamindars with magistrates of the districts assisted by Darogas and peons – did not also improve the system. In cities, Kotwals were retained. After these "reforms", crime soared and gangs of dacoits roamed all over the country.

A professional police system by way of an organised, centrally directed police had been started in India with the appointment of the first Inspector General of Police (IGP) in Bengal in 1808 for the divisions of Calcutta, Dacca and Murshidabad. The IGP had country-wide jurisdiction in British India for suppression of gangs and restoring peace although his basic title was Magistrate of the 24 Parganas. He recruited intelligence agents (called "goyendas"), a system which was later adopted by Col. Sleeman in his

drive against the Thugs. After seeing its success, the British extended the system to Patna, Bihar and Bareilly divisions. After some time, this system also came into disrepute when the goyendas started committing violent robberies. In 1829 this system was abolished and police control was reverted to Collector-Magistrate in each district with Divisional Revenue Commissioners overseeing their work.

Even these changes did not improve the situation. The subordinates became corrupt and inefficient, resulting in increased crime. The Darogahas (Company Police) were also corrupt. Whenever they visited villages with their entourage, the expenses for food were to be met by the villages. Each local watchman had to pay the Darogaha a yearly bribe of Rs. 3 (Dash, 2006). The 1832 British House of Commons Select Committee on the East India Company wanted changes to be made. Ideas were floated regarding professional policing with a Superintendent-General placed in each province.

In 1843 Sind was annexed by the British. Commander-in-Chief Sir Charles Napier set up the first professional military police system in Sind based on the Irish Constabulary model. He utilized a part of his army to do police functions. In 1853 Sir Georgia Clerk, Governor of Bombay, copied that system in Bombay after visiting Sindh. In each district a Superintendent of Police (SP) was appointed as chief of a professional police department assisted by a native police officer for each Tehsil or township (Kak, 1962). The SP was generally considered as subordinate to the district magistrate. A Commissioner of Police was appointed for the state and he also doubled up as Inspector of Prisons. Similar changes were made in the Punjab after its annexation in 1849, and in Madras in 1859. During the 1857 Uprising, the Punjab military police was of great use to the British in its suppression.

The British Government took over the administration of India after the 1857 Uprising. A Police Commission was appointed in 1860 to reorganize the police administration in British India with a view to cutting costs and increasing efficiency. This Commission recommended abolition of the military police as a separate organisation, and the constitution of a single homogeneous force of civil constabulary for

police duties. The general management of the force in each province was entrusted to an Inspector-General to ensure uniformity for the whole of India. The police in each district would be under a District Superintendent, who, in large districts, would have an Assistant District Superintendent, both Europeans. The subordinate force consisted of Inspectors, head constables, sergeants and constables. A head constable was put in charge of a police station and the Inspector for a group of stations. The seeds of the present Indian police system were thus laid in 1861 by the Police Act (*Police Commission Report*, 1860).

The 1902-03 Police Commission was not impressed with this system: "Everywhere they went, the Commission heard the bitterest complaints of the corruption of the police. These complaints were made not by non-officials only, but also by officials of all classes including Magistrates and police officers, both European and Native." They found that this corrupt system flourished when low paid constables were given investigating powers. Supervision by Inspectors was ineffective. "In more than one province the Commission have had before them teachers who said that they could not encourage good lads to go into the police service, and parents who confessed that they had to remove their sons from appointments in it so as to keep them straight" (*Indian Police Commission 1902-03*).

THE IMPACT OF THE 1857 UPRISING ON POLICING

Historians are still debating the origins of the 1857 Uprising. In its aftermath, some British officials decided it was a "mutiny" by extremist Muslims in the Company's army to restore Mughul rule by installing Bahadur Shah Zafar as the King. This was disputed by enlightened British politicians. Even today, it is commonly assumed that the trigger for the 1857 incidents was the introduction by the British of new cartridges for the new Enfield Rifles that were greased with cow and pig fat. This is not entirely correct. Signs of resentment among the native troops under the East India Company had erupted even in 1806 in Madras for various reasons, including their uniform. Then British Governor of Madras Sir William Bentinick had introduced a new

uniform with hats with leather cockades instead of turbans. This led to the "Vellore Mutiny". As British historian Mike Dash explained: "The order had been widely regarded as anathema in a country where a hat was the symbol of a Christian convert and leather was not only an abomination to all Hindus but an object of suspicion to Muslim soldiers, who thought that the material in question might be pigskin rather than cowhide" (Dash, 2006). The mutineers seized the Vellore Fort and killed or wounded 200 British troops. Bentinick was recalled to England, although he made a re-appearance in Calcutta as Governor-General in 1828.

Meanwhile calls for religious, nationalist and social reforms had started to rise in India. This trend was indirectly helped by the Company's efforts to spread English education through the country. That era also saw the rise of social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Jyotirao Phule, religious leaders such as Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Arya Samaj founder Dayananda Saraswati, and freedom fighters like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who were very influential in this new awakening. That era also saw indigenous people rising in violent protests like the Kol rebellion in Central India (1829-1839) and Santhal rebellion (1855-56) which were brutally put down by British troops.

The 1857 Uprising which lasted 1 year and 6 months (from 10 May 1857 to 1 November 1858) was a very long resistance movement which started from Meerut, a garrison town now in Uttar Pradesh, quite near New Delhi. It ended with the defeat of the combined rebel army at Gwalior in present-day Madhya Pradesh on 20 June 1858. The exact causes are still in dispute. The British believed that it was a Wahhabi conspiracy to restore Mughal rule. This was because the very first act of the rebels was to reach Delhi from Meerut and declare the 81-year old Bahadur Shah Zafar as the Emperor of Hindustan.

However, the House of Commons debate on this incident saw many voices complaining that the East India Company had failed to feel the pulse of the Indian people. Till then the Company did not have any civil intelligence agency on an all-India basis. Benjamin Disraeli, then Opposition member, blamed the East India

Company for destroying the "native authority" by not respecting India's religious rights and customs. At a Parliament sitting on July 27, 1857, he said that the revolt was more than a mere mutiny of Indian troops. He blamed the Company's administration policies, imposition of property settlement and the aggressive Christian missionaries for disrupting the Indian society, thereby creating an environment conducive to revolt or resistance (Anand, 2019).

Later British scholars agreed with him. The late Prof Christopher Bayly wrote in his book, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication*, that the primary reason for intelligence failure before 1857 was the inability of the Company administration to understand India since "colonial knowledge was derived from a considerable extent from indigenous knowledge, albeit torn out of context and distorted by fear and prejudice" (Bayly, 1996, cited by Roque, 2016).

WHY A CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS SET UP UNDER THE INDIAN POLICE

Three major security and political developments compelled the British to use Sleeman's national police for collecting political and security intelligence on an all-India basis. The first was the 1857 Uprising and the second was the assassination of Viceroy Lord Mayo in the Andamans Penal Settlement, Port Blair, on 8 February 1872 by Sher Ali Afridi, a former soldier from Khyber Agency. The third reason was the formation of the Indian National Congress on 28 December 1885.

Till 1857 India was ruled by the East India Company which had left the security of British India and British officials to the army. In the absence of a dependable intelligence service, varying reports on the army's discipline and loyalty were presented to the Governor General and to Whitehall in London. One senior official was found to have given different assessments at different points of time. These came to light during the House of Commons debate on what led to the Insurrection in 1857.

On 27th November 1849, then commander-in-chief Sir Charles Napier sent an assessment to the Governor General giving a glowing tribute to

the Indian soldiers: "This is a vast army, and it is in a good state of discipline, complete in its equipments, full of high courage, and a high military spirit reigns through all ranks." He said that three distinct Queen's armies in Bengal, Madras and Bombay had 300,000 fighting men and 400 pieces of artillery, ready to war. "Our service is extremely popular and the troops faithful to the proverb" (Napier, 1849).

The same officer changed his opinion in less than a year. On 15 June 1850 he wrote another assessment giving a dismal assessment on the Bengal Army. However, he blamed the British officers for the "deficiency of discipline, especially those of the higher ranks". He also said that the soldiers were far too often sent on civil duties and were not relieved (Napier, 1850).

Meanwhile a number of political assassinations shook the empire. The motives were either religious or political. In September 1853, Col Frederick Makeson, Commissioner of Peshawar, was stabbed to death. Acting Calcutta Chief Justice Norman was similarly killed in Calcutta on 20 September 1871. On 8 February 1872, Viceroy Lord Mayo was stabbed to death while he was visiting the penal settlement in the Andamans in the Bay of Bengal. On 22 June 1897, W C Rand, Plague Commissioner, and his military escort were shot dead in Poona by the "Chapekar Brothers", who were described as revolutionaries and followers of noted Congress leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak. On 1 July 1909, William H Curzon Wyllie, then ADC to Secretary of State for India Lord George Hamilton, was shot dead in London by revolutionary Madan Lal Dhingra.

Australian scholar Helen James calls the Lord Mayo assassination "the First Jihad" (James, 2009). The assailant Shere Ali, an Afridi-Pathan tribesman, was a 'loyal' British Cavalry trooper from Peshawar. He was convicted for a murder and was serving his sentence in the Andamans, the prisoner settlement. He was influenced by some "Wahhabi" prisoners who were serving their sentences for preaching jihad from mosques in Patna and Delhi during the 1857 Uprising.

Soon after Lord Mayo's killing, Viceroy Northbrook, Mayo's successor (1872-76), felt the need for "a detective police for political purposes" and asked the "Thugee and Dacoity Department" to

handle the assignment. This department was a very successful national police system for criminal-security intelligence and operations set up by Col William Sleeman in 1829. Sleeman, who was promoted to General Superintendent in 1835 to coordinate a dozen superintendents in India in collating and disseminating intelligence on Thug across an area of Indian territory that was larger than the United Kingdom, had mostly suppressed the Thughee menace by the time he was appointed in 1848 as the Resident of Oudh, the most coveted post for a political officer of the Bengal Presidency. After his departure, his *Thagi Daftar* (the Thug Office) was used for pan-India crime work to deal with other criminal gangs.

By 1887, Whitehall was sufficiently concerned about internal security that the Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cross, wrote a secret dispatch on 25th March to the Viceroy on the "collection of secret and political intelligence in India". The Marquess of Dufferin, who had assumed charge as Viceroy on 13 December 1884, wrote a secret reply on 15 November 1887 suggesting the use of the office and manpower of the Thughee and Dacoity Department to curtail cost. He also said that he intended to utilize in British India the services of the police force and, in Native States, the Political Officers for collection of intelligence on political, social and religious movements. A small office was set up with the Central Government called Central Special Branch to coordinate collection through the states.

Cross gave his approval on 23 December 1887. Thus 1887 is officially considered the founding year of the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB). To commemorate the IB's 125th anniversary in 2012, the Indian Police Journal brought out a special issue that contained a facsimile of the then classified correspondence between Dufferin and Cross.

Dufferin underscored the secrecy of the communications, as "it would not do for the native press to get it into their heads, that we were about to establish a Third Section after the Russian pattern." He was referring to the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery in Imperial Russia's secret police which was replaced by Okharna in 1880.

Researchers have since found deliberate attempts to hide the creation of a central intelligence agency to avoid public criticism. As Dash (2006) has observed: "As late as the latter years of the Second World War, the Government of India's intelligence agency – then based at Simla – was popularly known as the *Thagi Daftar*, the Thug Office."

As a result, the creation and working of the new intelligence organisation was camouflaged within the police in a two-tier system. That was also the reason why the police in India are still manning the intelligence services whereas this practice does not exist in most other democratic countries.

However, this did not work smoothly. D E McCracken, stationed at Shimla in charge of the Thugee Department, failed to produce any worthwhile intelligence except for a few reports. There were practical problems in motivating the police even in British States for which the Inspectors General had to be approached daily, and the Residents in princely states.

Meanwhile the 1901-02 Police Commission recommended the setting up of a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in each province, under a Deputy Inspector General of Police, for "collating and distributing information regarding organised crime and to assist in investigation of crimes when they are of special character".

To implement this, the centre abolished the Thugee Department and merged the Central Special Branch with the proposed Central CID, renaming it Central Criminal Intelligence Department (DCI). Harold A Stuart, the Inspector General of Police of the Madras Presidency, was appointed Director of the Central Criminal Intelligence with McCracken as Deputy Director on April, 19th, 1904 (Indian Police Department, 1904-6). The existing staff of the Thughee department was absorbed in the DCI.

HOW INTELLIGENCE BUREAU BECAME A POLICE ORGANISATION

As a result Indian intelligence grew as a law & order intelligence organisation with occasional forays into foreign domains. Meanwhile Great Britain continued to look after strategic collection, including watching over the Indian

freedom struggle incited from abroad.

There was yet another reason which became public knowledge only in 1997 when British secret records were declassified. A "shadowy organisation" named "Indian Political Intelligence" (IPI) was formed in 1921 within the Public and Judicial Department of the India Office in London, which was responsible for the internal and external security of British India. The expression "shadowy" was given by Jill Geber of the British Library, Oriental & India Office Collection (Geber, 1997). The idea for this agency was mooted in 1909 when anarchist and subversive activities erupted in England and in Bengal and Punjab. The assassination of William Hutt Curzon Wyllie in London on 1 July 1909 by Madanlal Dhingra was the immediate reason. At that time, armed revolutionary activities were spreading in India.

The British government strongly suspected foreign hands, especially German, Turkish and Afghan governments, in stoking rebellion by Indians. On 2 August 1914 an "Intelligence Bureau for the East" was opened as part of the German Auswartiges Amt (Foreign Office) under Baron Max von Oppenheim to help rebel movements in South Asia against the British Empire. The activities of the Ghadar movement from Canada and their frequent travels to India made Charles Cleveland, the then Director of Central Intelligence write to London for help as he was not getting cooperation from the State CIDs (Popplewell, 1995).

In 1910 Major John Arnold Wallinger, a senior Indian Police officer was deputed to London to watch global Indian subversive links. This was the nucleus of the IPI. In 1915 another Indian Police officer named Philip C Vickery joined him. John Wallinger retired in April 1926 when Vickery took over as head of IPI in October 1926. British, European, and American operations were run by them from London with the help of Scotland Yard and MI6. Indian operations were run by the Director of the Intelligence Bureau.

This went on till Indian independence in 1947. The files were transferred to London when T G Sanjevi Pillai took over as the first Indian Director Intelligence Bureau in August 1947. The rump of IPI was merged with OS4 branch of the British Security Service (MI5). These files were declassified in London only in 1997.

STAFFING INTELLIGENCE

In most other democratic countries, intelligence agencies recruit their own staff and do not depend upon the police as the feeder service. This is based on operational considerations when intelligence needs low profile execution of their charter. For example, in the UK and US, intelligence agencies do their own recruitment of personnel.

Indeed, Canada believes that there is a clash between the responsibilities of the police and intelligence. From 1868 to the 1980s, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and its earlier incarnation, Western Frontier Constabulary, handled national intelligence functions. However various controversies centered on excesses by RCMP forced the Canadian Government to set up two national commissions which recommended divesting RCMP of its role in national security intelligence and establishing a civilian intelligence agency under parliamentary control.

The 1969 Mackenzie Commission recommended that police and intelligence functions be separated. "We feel, in short, that the professional security service officer is quite different from the professional policeman and that this difference should be reflected in recruiting methods, in training and career patterns and in organisational structures" (Mackenzie Commission, 1969). However, this was not implemented.

The McDonald Commission was constituted by the Pierre Trudeau government in 1977 to look into certain illegal activities by the RCMP in the wake of the kidnapping and killing of Quebec minister Pierre Laporte in 1970 by the Quebec Liberation Front. It was alleged that despite prior information, the RCMP failed to prevent the kidnapping. Stung by the criticism, the RCMP carried out certain illegal activities to prevent disturbances prior to the 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal. Concluded the McDonald Commission in its 1980 report: "Law enforcement and security work are incompatible." As a result the Canadian Security & Intelligence Service

Act was passed in 1984, creating a new civilian agency, the Canadian Security & Intelligence Service (CSIS).

In India when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked R N Kao to establish a professional foreign intelligence agency, she specifically asked him not to set it up on the lines of a central police organisation but to man it as a multi-disciplinary body to tackle the complexities of coverage of strategic intelligence in the areas of defence, foreign, economic and scientific developments so as to help the policy makers. Consequently, attempts were made to recruit talents from different streams available within the government in addition to recruiting direct entrants to a new service to form the core of the future senior management.

Prime Minister Gandhi did not mean to deride the police work but was right that foreign intelligence needed something more than police skills. Police is a hierarchical and transparent organisation, accountable to law and society for their actions. Foreign intelligence is a secret multi-specialty responsibility requiring special skills to do unconventional work abroad in hostile surroundings.

Intelligence tradecraft is also based on deniability and subterfuge. The Indian Police Service Civil list, on the other hand, is a public document. Unfortunately the policy of recruiting widely established by the late Kao was breached after 2004 with the induction of more and more police officers in a revolving door pattern, leaving them no time to gain subject or area expertise.

My own experience running the old Bombay Special Branch (SB) between 1973 and 1976 informs me that a typical law and order mindset might also not be suitable for domestic or foreign security operations. In the early 1970s, any textile, railway or municipal strike in the city would have nationwide repercussions. Every Chief Minister of the State insisted that I had to brief him every morning. This is because unlike the regular police in Bombay who considered politicians, trade unions and religious bodies as opponents of law and order, those of us in the SB used to consider them as "assets". We would intervene tactically and settle many strikes or religious disputes.

Some intelligence agencies try to get officers for short tours from other government departments on what is called "deputation". India practises this. This is not advisable at all. To quote Allen Dulles, the father of modern American intelligence: "A sizable turnover of short term employees is dangerous because it means that working methods, identities of key personnel and certain projects in progress will have been exposed in some measure to persons not yet sufficiently indoctrinated in the habits of security to judge when they are talking out of turn and when they are not" (Dulles, 1963).

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