Involving in foreign military and Sar-El Volunteer Corps

Questions:

Mr Fadli Fawzi: To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) how were the authorities made aware in 2025 of the blog post which included a hyperlink to a website that redirected users to the website of the Sar-El Volunteer Corps (Singapore); (b) whether the authorities advised the individual to take down the blog, and on what basis; and (c) why were these events not made public immediately. 

Mr Yip Hon Weng: To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs in light of reports that two Singaporeans who volunteered with an Israeli military-linked organisation in 2016 were uninvolved in combat (a) how does the Ministry determine whether involvement with a foreign military constitutes participation in a foreign armed conflict; and (b) where is the line drawn between permissible non-combat roles such as logistics, supply support, or private consultancy, and prohibited involvement. 

Answer:

Mr K Shanmugam, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs:

1. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) issued a joint statement on 24 March 2026 pertaining to two individuals (A and B) who had volunteered with Sar-El in December 2016. Members may refer to the joint statement for the facts.

2. In 2024, the Internal Security Department (ISD) learned about the blog post made by A, which included a hyperlink to his website that in turn redirected users to the Sar-El Volunteer Corps (Singapore) website. For operational reasons, we do not discuss ISD’s methodologies or sources.

3. At that time, A was based overseas pursuing his undergraduate studies. ISD subsequently engaged A, along with his father B, when A returned to Singapore in 2025. ISD’s investigations concluded that A and B were not involved in any military activities with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Nevertheless, ISD advised A and B that A’s blog post was inappropriate in the context of the conflict in Gaza. Following ISD’s engagement, A voluntarily took down the blog post. A and B are no longer involved with Sar-El.

4. Many such conversations take place with individuals who wish to go to Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, or other conflict zones. We do not make these conversations public, when the individuals comply, and there are no security issues. When the events involving A and B were re-surfaced recently, MHA and MINDEF provided an account of the facts known to Government.

5. In general, we do not want Singaporean citizens to be involved in foreign militaries. When the conduct is linked with entities which are not strictly speaking military outfits, but the entities are nevertheless associated with foreign militaries, then whether that is objectionable depends on the facts of each case. We have to look at what the entity does, and its relationship with the military.

6. In A and B’s case, they were not involved in any military activities in 2016 and no action needed to be taken. However, based on what is currently known about Sar-El and its activities today in support of the IDF, involvement in the group, as well as other organisations with similar objectives, would not be acceptable and Singaporeans should not volunteer with Sar-El. We will consider taking action under our laws, including the Internal Security Act, against any person who still plans to or does proceed to volunteer under these circumstances, or who is otherwise involved in activities found to be prejudicial to Singapore’s national security and interests.