MHA-MINDEF joint statement on social media posts of an individual who encouraged volunteering with Sar-El

1. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) have recently become aware of some social media posts that referred to content from a blog that was posted sometime in 2018 or 2019, which encouraged volunteering with Sar-El. The blog content had been taken down in 2025 by the Singaporean individual (“A”) who posted it but was recently re-posted by other social media users.

2. In December 2016, for around two weeks, A and his father (“B”) volunteered with Sar-El. Midway through the volunteering, B wrote to the Singaporean authorities to enquire whether A could participate in volunteer activities with Sar-El as part of his school’s volunteer programme. B informed the Singapore authorities that:

(a) As part of the volunteer programme of A’s school in the United States, A will participate in the Sar-El volunteer programme organised by Israeli volunteers and the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) Logistics Corps.

(b) A and B understood that under Singapore law, Singaporeans shall not serve in a foreign military organisation.

(c) Participants in Sar-El do not pledge allegiance to the IDF or Israel and do not serve in combat roles or take up arms. Volunteers handle work like packing, painting, sorting, cleaning, washing, and cooking.

3. In essence, they would not take part in any combat roles. Based on that, B asked if A could volunteer with Sar-El.

4. Sar-El’s website around that time in 2016 stated that Sar-El assists the IDF, and Sar-El’s volunteers would work in IDF warehouses and be given guided tours of some locations in Israel as well as lectures on Jewish and Israeli topics (see screenshot in Annex).

5. Based on the information provided by B and the available information on Sar-El’s website in 2016, the authorities told B that:

(a) It appears that participation in the Sar-El volunteer programme did not constitute service in a foreign military.

(b) A’s participation in the programme is not endorsed or authorised.

(c) A is participating in the programme on his own volition, with full awareness of the risks involved.

6. By the time the authorities replied to B’s email, A and B had completed their two-week volunteer programme with Sar-El.

7. Sometime around 2018 or 2019, A made a post on a blog that displayed a photograph of himself in a National Cadet Corps ceremonial uniform. The post included a hyperlink to his website, which contained a link to redirect users to the website of the Sar-El Volunteer Corps (Singapore).

8. In 2025, the Internal Security Department (“ISD”) engaged A and B after learning about the blog post. Based on ISD’s investigations, ISD concluded that A and B were not involved in any military activities with the IDF. After ISD’s engagement with them, A took down the blog post. A and B are no longer involved with Sar-El.

9. No action was taken against A and B for their activities in 2016, based on the facts known at that time. Since 2016, MINDEF has not evaluated any similar requests with respect to Sar-El. However, Sar-El's website currently states that Sar-El is “deeply committed to supporting the IDF”, and its volunteers “work side-by-side with soldiers on IDF bases”, with their “volunteer service contribut[ing] directly to the security of Israel”. Being involved in organisations like Sar-El on these terms today would not be acceptable and action will be taken under our laws against anyone whose involvement in such activities are found to be prejudicial to Singapore’s national security and interests.

10. Separately, there is no information to suggest that A and B’s volunteering in Sar-El in December 2016 is related to the recent foreign news report that two Singaporeans may be among those who fought for the IDF during the conflict in Gaza, as published by Declassified UK on 11 February 2026.

Annex

1. Sar-El Website ↗ (opens in new tab) (PDF, 233 KB)