Safeguards to prevent foreign actors from using Singapore-based institutions and recruiting former public officers for covert intelligence-gathering
8 September 2026
Question:
Mr Yip Hon Weng: To ask the Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs in light of suspicious entities masquerading as Singapore-based think tanks and recruiting former public officers for privileged information (a) what safeguards prevent foreign actors from exploiting Singapore as a base for covert intelligence-gathering; and (b) how authorities identify, block, deregister and take action against entities suspected of facilitating such activities.
Answer:
Mr K Shanmugam, Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs:
1. This reply will also address Ms Hany Soh’s question for tomorrow’s sitting, on foreign intelligence using employment as a recruitment cover, and how Singaporeans can help counter this subversive threat.
2. The Ministry of Home Affairs takes a serious view of entities who attempt to use Singapore as a cover to obtain privileged or sensitive information through deceptive means. We will investigate any such attempts and take decisive action to neutralise the threat.
3. We have not found any increase in Singapore-registered entities which purportedly offer employment opportunities as a means for foreign intelligence recruitment. However, we have detected an uptick in attempts by threat actors to set up websites which masquerade as Singapore-based entities, to recruit individuals to gain access to sensitive/classified information. Most of these websites are set up overseas.
4. The Government has a range of legislative levers to guard against such threat actors. For example, the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) allows authorities to deal more effectively with online activities that are criminal in nature, including offences that affect national security, national harmony, and individual safety. We recently issued an Access Blocking Direction under OCHA against the Global Asia Think Tank website following an assessment arising from a police report lodged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Internal Security Act also allows us to act against activities that are prejudicial to Singapore’s national security and/or interests. In addition, the Official Secrets Act and the Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act criminalise the unauthorised disclosure of official documents and information by former and existing public officers.
5. The Ministry of Home Affairs monitors and acts against threats of espionage and foreign interference through various mechanisms. We are unable to disclose details of the methods used for monitoring and action for operational reasons.
6. Both serving and former public officers, as well as others who have access to sensitive/classified information, must remain vigilant to such threats and report suspicious approaches to the relevant authorities. We will also raise awareness of these threats among the wider public. If individuals encounter a suspicious approach, they should take steps to verify if an entity is legitimate before providing further information.
