Second Reading of the Protection From Scams Bill - Opening Speech by Ms Sun Xueling, Minister of State, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Social and Family Development

Introduction

1. Mr Speaker, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.

Scams Situation

2. Sir, the scams situation continues to be of grave concern in Singapore. Preliminary indicators show that the number of scam cases and losses would have increased by about 10% and 40% respectively in 2024, compared to 2023.

3. Over the past few years, government agencies have worked closely with banks to put in place measures to safeguard the public from scams. For example:

(a) Money Lock, which allows bank customers to set aside a portion of funds in their bank accounts that cannot be transferred digitally; and

(b) Kill-Switch, which allows bank customers to suspend their accounts quickly if they suspect that their bank accounts have been compromised.

4. Despite the safeguards and extensive public education efforts, we still see a high number of scams involving self-effected transfers, where individuals willingly transfer monies to scammers. From January to September 2024, self-effected transfers accounted for 86% of all scams reports and 94% of losses.

(a) These include government officials impersonation scams, investment scams and internet love scams.

(b) Such scams rely on social engineering, and prey on respect for authority, greed, and the human desire for companionship and love.

5. In some cases, the Police have observed that the victims were so taken in by the scammers’ deceit, that they refused to believe that they were being scammed, despite being repeatedly advised by family, friends, their bank and even the Police. By the time these victims realised the truth, the scammers had siphoned their monies out of Singapore. Let me give you a few examples.

(a) In a love scam case, a 64-year-old female victim befriended the scammer on a social media platform and entered into an online relationship with him. The scammer claimed to be working on an offshore oil rig project outside Singapore and told the victim that once his project was completed, he could come to Singapore to marry her. Over the course of about two years, the scammer repeatedly asked for money from the victim, claiming it was to buy equipment for the project or to pay his workers’ salary. Each time, the victim transferred the money to various bank accounts designated by the scammer. Despite attempts by the Police and her family to convince her that she was being scammed, she continued to make money transfers to the scammer. It was only after multiple engagements by the Police that the victim was finally convinced that she was being scammed. By that time, unfortunately, the victim had already lost about $400,000 to the scammer.

(b) In another case – and this is an example of love and investment scam - a 33-year-old male victim met the scammer on an online dating platform. The scammer slowly gained the victim’s trust, eventually deceiving the victim into believing that they were in a relationship. The scammer then introduced the victim to a fake investment opportunity promising substantial profits. Believing that the investment opportunity was legitimate, the victim made several transactions to multiple bank accounts on the scammer’s instructions. The transactions amounted to a total of $200,000. Despite being engaged by both banks and the Police, the victim remained unconvinced that the person was a scammer. He subsequently even attempted to borrow money from his parents to fund the “investment”. It took multiple attempts by the Police before he was convinced.

6. These are but two examples of the cases of victims that the Police have encountered.

7. In these cases, the Police and the banks have no legal powers to stop the victim from making further transactions. The victim would continue to lose more money to the scammers until he or she is eventually convinced that he or she is being scammed. In some of these cases, the victims have appealed to the Government for financial assistance.

8. Mr Speaker, Sir, it is not just the victim who suffers. Their loved ones – spouses, children, parents – suffer too. They often have to support the victim emotionally and financially as he deals with the loss – sometimes amounting to a lifetime of savings. These families and friends, they feel frustrated and helpless. They wish that more could have been done to protect their loved ones.

9. In such situations, the authorities should have powers to intervene decisively. The MHA has therefore tabled this Bill to introduce new powers for the authorities to step in and stem further scam losses.

Scope of Bill

10. This Bill empowers specified officers, including Police officers and Commercial Affairs officers, to issue a Restriction Order (RO) to banks to restrict the banking transactions of an individual, if there is reason to believe that he will make money transfers to a scammer, withdraw any money and give it to a scammer, or apply for or draw down from any credit facility with the intention of benefitting a scammer. The intent is to buy the Police more time to engage and convince the individual that he is being scammed, including through enlisting the help of his family members. The RO will only be issued as a last resort, if all other efforts to convince the individual have failed.

11. Clause 2 of the Bill defines a scammer as a person who has interacted with the scam victim substantially via remote communication, for the purposes of committing or facilitating the commission of a scam offence.

12. The MHA has filed a Notice of Amendment, to remove the word “substantially” from the definition of a scammer in Clause 2 as well as to remove the words “of conducted remotely” from the long title.

(a) MHA’s policy intent in introducing the power to issue the ROs is primarily to protect victims from remote scams. However, the Police have observed some cases where scammers introduce elements of physical interaction to strengthen the deception. These amendments will remove ambiguity over whether ROs can be issued in such cases.

13. Clause 3 empowers a specified officer to issue an RO to a bank. The RO will direct the bank not to execute any banking transaction from an individual’s bank account, and not to allow any draw-down of credit facilities.

(a) In other words, an individual who is subject to an RO will have his bank accounts, ATM facilities and credit facilities suspended.  Nevertheless, the individual will be provided access to his monies for daily living expenses. This will be covered in Clause 5 of the Bill, which I will elaborate on later.

(b) Operationally, the RO will be issued to the seven Domestic Systemically Important Banks (or DSIBs), which account for the vast majority of consumer bank accounts in Singapore. The RO will also be issued to a non-DSIB bank, if there is reasonable suspicion that the victim will effect transfers to a scammer from a non-DSIB account or withdraw money from it to give it to a scammer.

14. Clause 4 specifies the threshold that must be crossed before an RO can be issued. First, the specified officer must have reason to believe that the individual will transfer money to a scammer, withdraw money and give it to a scammer, or apply for draw down from a credit facility with the intention of benefitting a scammer. Second, the specified officer must determine that the RO is necessary for the protection of the individual.

15. With the amendment to remove the word “substantially” from the definition of a scammer in Clause 2, the legal power to issue ROs would technically extend beyond remote scams to more traditional cheating cases, which involve mostly physical interactions and where the other party is known to the individual in real life. Traditional cheating cases are more complex and require deeper investigation to establish if there is indeed an offence. For example, in a case of cheating alleged to be committed by a real friend or real lover, it is not always clear at the outset whether a criminal offence is disclosed, unlike in remote scams. Hence, the threshold to issue ROs in such cases will be higher. A specified officer will only issue an RO in an exceptional case when there is clear and incontrovertible evidence that a relevant offence is disclosed. Similarly, the specified officer must determine that the RO is necessary for the protection of an individual.

16. The decision to issue an RO will be made solely by the Police, based on a holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. While the wishes of the individual and his family members may be taken into consideration, the Police will make the final decision.

Safeguards

17. MHA is mindful of the need to strike a balance between protecting an individual from further harm, and not unduly inconvenience him. The Bill takes this into consideration, and puts in place four sets of safeguards.

18. First, Clause 4 of the Bill requires that an RO be issued only if necessary for the protection of the victim. An RO is thus issued as a last resort. Where there are still other options available for protecting the victim, the Police will first explore those options.

(a) Let me give you an example. The Police are notified by the bank that a person is making large transactions to an account linked to a love scammer. Despite multiple engagements by the Police, the victim refuses to believe the Police and continues to make transfers to the scammer. As part of their engagements with the victim, the Police find out that the victim has a sibling whom he is close to and he trusts. A specified officer may not issue an RO to restrict the victim’s banking transactions or use of credit facilities, if the victim and the sibling agree to an arrangement where the sibling will monitor the victim’s transactions via a joint account and can advise the victim against making further transfers to the scammer.

19. Second, Clause 5 of the Bill limits the duration of an RO to a maximum of 30 days at the outset. This provides assurance that the restrictions will not be imposed for longer than is necessary to protect the individual, while ensuring that the Police have sufficient time to further engage and convince the individual. During this period, the Police may work with the individual’s friends or family members and gather further evidence. The individual may also be referred to a counsellor or a social service agency for support.

(a) A specified officer may cancel the RO ahead of the 30-day limit, if the officer assesses that the individual is no longer at risk of making money transfers to the scammer.

(b) Clause 5 also empowers a specified officer to extend the RO for up to 30 days at a time, up to a maximum of five extensions, if the officer assesses that more time is required to persuade the individual.

(c) The initial RO and five potential extensions will last up to a maximum of 180 days. After this, the RO must lapse. The RO will not be extended further, even if the victim is still at risk of transferring more money to the scammer and may well do so after the RO lapses. MHA takes a practical approach to this – we cannot handhold the victim indefinitely, nor do we have the resources to do so. But we will do all that we can, while the RO is in force, to bring the individual to his senses.

20. Third, Clause 5 empowers a specified officer to vary the RO temporarily to allow the individual to have access to the money in his bank accounts. For example, upon application by the individual, a specified officer will allow him to withdraw a fixed amount of money for the purposes of daily living, or to pay medical bills or insurance premiums.

21. Fourth, Clause 7 provides for an appeal process so that an individual can appeal against the issuance of an RO to the Commissioner of Police, whose decision is final. Given that the RO will remain active pending the assessment of the appeal, the MHA will ensure that the appeal process is expeditious.

Public Consultation

22. The MHA has conducted public consultations on the Bill. Around 90% of the respondents expressed support for the proposals. Some recounted past experiences where their family members or friends were scammed and commented that the RO would have been useful in those situations.

23. A minority of the respondents, however, highlighted the need to respect individual autonomy, and were concerned that such powers would be intrusive.

24. The MHA acknowledges these concerns.

(a) As I explained earlier, ROs will only be issued temporarily, and only as a last resort. Specified officers would have conducted investigations to satisfy themselves that the individual is indeed being targeted by a scammer, and would have futilely engaged the individual, before issuing the RO. We will also put in place safeguards to ensure that the powers are used judiciously.

25. Mr Speaker, the Police have a duty to protect the public from harm, and to prevent crime. The cost of falling prey to scams does not only affect the scam victim. Often , their family members and even government finances are needed to support scam victims in the aftermath. We thus have a collective responsibility to protect potential scam victims.  This Bill allows the Police to act decisively and close a gap in our arsenal against scammers. While this Bill alone may not significantly dent the total number of scams, it will save some individuals and their loved ones much agony and pain. I hope that Members of this House will support the Bill.

26. But even as we continue to work on providing protection to scam victims, we must remember that scam prevention and mitigation is not the responsibility of the Government alone, nor can we succeed alone. Combatting scams requires the whole of society, and we must all continue to work together to protect ourselves and our loved ones from scams.

27. Mr Speaker, Sir, with your permission, I would now like to speak in Mandarin.

28. 从2024年1月至9月，受害者自愿转账的案件占所有诈骗案件的86%，占所有损失的94%。此类诈骗利用人们对权威的尊重、人性的欲望以及对陪伴和爱情的渴望，实施诈骗活动。

29. 在某些情况下，受害者深信诈骗者的谎言，即使家人、银行或警方告知他们真相，他们也依然拒绝相信。警方和银行没有法律权力去阻止受害者进一步转账，因此受害者可能会继续将钱转给诈骗者，直到他们最终意识到自己被骗，或者直到他们倾家荡产。

30. 不仅是受害者本人受害，他们的家人、配偶、子女和父母也可能需要在经济上和情感上支持受害者。一些家庭甚至不得不寻求政府的帮助以及来获得经济援助。

31. 因此，当局需要拥有果断干预的权力，这正是为什么《防诈骗保障法案》的引入是必要的，该法案使得警方可以介入，并遏制进一步的诈骗损失。

32. 通过该限制令，如果有合理理由相信某人准备将钱转给诈骗者，警方可以与银行合作，限制个别人士的银行交易和信贷服务。

33. 限制令是一个最后的屏障。仅会在所有其他劝说努力都失败后，才会发出。根据法案，限制令的有效期最长为30天，并可延长最多五次，总时长不超过180天。在这期间，警方将与当事人的朋友或家人合作，收集更多证据。当事人也可能被转介给辅导员或社会服务机构接受辅导。当事人也可以申请提取固定金额的资金，用于日常生活开支、支付医疗账单和保险费用。

34. 我们相信，这一法案是必要的，因为它可以帮助我们尽最大的可能，去减少受害人的损失，让他们不会因为一时冲动或一时的恐惧，而倾家荡产，追悔莫及。

35. 谢谢。