Second reading of the Road Traffic (Miscelleanous Amendments) Bill - Opening speech by Ms Sim Ann, Second Minister for Foreign Affairs & Second Minister for Home Affairs

Mr Speaker,

1. On behalf of the Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a second time.

Introduction

2. Sir, road safety remains a key priority for the Ministry. Road accidents, which can lead to severe and irreversible consequences for victims and their families, are entirely preventable. Our accident rate and fatality numbers need to come down. Last year we had a record high of 149 fatalities – almost one death every two days on the roads.

3. There are several pillars in our approach towards promoting road safety. One pillar is having strong and effective laws. Over the years, the Ministry has reviewed and updated the Road Traffic Act (“RTA”) to ensure that it remains fit for purpose. Since 2019, the Act has been amended four times. We seek to do so again today, to achieve three key objectives:

(a) First, strengthen accountability for the most egregious road conduct;

(b) Second, further deter driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs; and

(c) Third, enhance the Traffic Police’s ability to detect and enforce against traffic offences.

Strengthen accountability for the most egregious road conduct

4. Sir, the most egregious road conduct must be met with sufficiently severe consequences. We will amend the RTA in two ways to ensure this.

Introduce a new offence of purposeful endangerment

5. First, the Bill introduces a new offence of purposeful endangerment where an offender deliberately uses a motor vehicle to endanger another person’s life or safety, resulting in death or grievous hurt.

6. Members may recall the case of Jarrett Tee. Whilst racing a motorcyclist along a highway, the offender deliberately swerved his car to cut off the motorcycle – and prior to doing so, said to his passengers, “Do you want to see motorcycle fly?” . The offender’s car then side-swiped the motorcycle, causing the motorcyclist and the pillion passenger to be flung off the motorcycle. The pillion rider passed away as a result. The Prosecution described the case as, “one of the worst examples of dangerous driving possible” and his culpability was “on the extreme end of high”. Yet the most serious charge that the offender could face based on the facts of the case was dangerous driving causing death, which carries a maximum imprisonment sentence of 8 years.

7. The Government's view is that such conduct must face harsher consequences. Where an offender deliberately uses a vehicle to endanger another person's life or safety, for example, by deliberately swerving a motor vehicle towards another driver to force the latter off the road, or purposefully driving one’s vehicle towards another road user — the offender's culpability is significantly higher than that of a driver who speeds or beats a red light. The law must recognise this distinction.

8. However, existing RTA offences do not adequately distinguish purposeful endangerment from dangerous driving. It may also be challenging for the prosecution to prove that the conduct fulfilled the mental elements required for more serious Penal Code offences, such as murder, culpable homicide, or voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous means. For example, in a case like Jarrett Tee, where a driver deliberately swerves to cut off the motorcycle, it may be difficult to prove that he did so with the knowledge that death or grievous hurt was likely to result.

9. Clause 6 therefore introduces a new offence of purposeful endangerment. It fills a gap in respect of offenders who deliberately use their vehicle to endanger another person’s life or safety. Given the severity of the conduct, the penalties for the offence will be higher than those for dangerous driving causing death. Where death is caused, the offender is to be punished with imprisonment which may extend to 15 years, and is also liable to fine, or caning or both. The court must also impose driving disqualification for life, unless there are special reasons not to do so; and if special reasons apply, the court must impose at least 10 years of driving disqualification. The court may also order the forfeiture of the vehicle used in the commission of the offence. The offence will apply even if the person who died or suffered grievous hurt is not the person whom the offender intended to endanger. This ensures that the offender remains fully accountable for the consequences of their conduct.

Increase the maximum penalties for dangerous and careless driving causing grievous hurt

10. Second, the Bill raises the penalties for careless and dangerous driving causing grievous hurt.

11. We are making this amendment because the most serious forms of grievous hurt may cause victims to suffer permanent, life-altering consequences, leaving them unable to work, live independently or care for themselves. For example, members may recall a recent case of an auxiliary police officer who was on duty at Tuas Checkpoint when a drunk driver collided into him. He survived the collision but suffered traumatic brain injuries and is now paralysed and requires lifelong care.

12. The penalties in such cases must be proportionate to the harm. Yet today, the maximum penalties for reckless or dangerous driving, which I will hereafter refer to as dangerous driving, causing grievous hurt under the RTA remain significantly lower than those causing death. Clause 7 therefore increases the maximum penalties for dangerous driving causing grievous hurt, bringing them closer to the corresponding offences causing death. For dangerous driving causing grievous hurt, the Bill increases the maximum imprisonment term for first-time offenders from five years to seven years, and for repeat offenders from 10 years to 13 years.

13. Clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill also increase the additional imprisonment terms that serious offenders may be liable for referring to those who drove under the influence of alcohol or drugs. For both careless driving – also known as driving without due care or reasonable consideration – and dangerous driving causing grievous hurt, the maximum uplift for serious offenders will increase from one year to one and a half years’ imprisonment. For serious repeat offenders, who are convicted of a dangerous or careless driving offence committed while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and who have a previous conviction for driving under the influence, the maximum uplift will increase from two years to three and a half years’ imprisonment.

14. Our intention is for the increased penalty range to only apply to the most egregious cases. We do not intend to affect the prevailing sentencing benchmarks for those with lower culpability or who cause less serious forms of grievous hurt. The Ministry will work with the Sentencing Advisory Panel to develop sentencing guidelines to give effect to this intent.


Further deter driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs

15. Sir, the second objective of this Bill is to further deter driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

16. Sir, driving under the influence of such substances is simply inexcusable. It poses a serious threat to the safety of all road users. Every instance of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs is entirely preventable and highly culpable. It reflects conscious and reckless risk-taking behaviour. Yet, year after year, we continue to see far too many motorists make this dangerous decision. Over the past five years, the Traffic Police detected between 1,500 to 1,800 drink-driving violations annually. And we know this is an under-detection, because drink driving generally can only be detected at roadblocks, and with our limited operational resources we cannot be setting up roadblocks everywhere.

17. This Bill introduces two provisions to enhance deterrence against driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Tighten the prescribed alcohol limits

18. First, Clauses 11 and 19 tighten the prescribed alcohol limits from exceeding 35 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath to 15 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, and from exceeding 80 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood to 30 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

19. The current prescribed alcohol limits have been in force since 1985. Since then, scientific understanding of alcohol impairment has advanced considerably. Many jurisdictions, including Thailand, Philippines, Australia and South Korea, have adopted lower prescribed alcohol limits. The evidence today consistently shows that even low levels of alcohol can impair a driver’s reaction time, judgement, concentration and ability to respond safely to situations. As blood alcohol concentration increases, the degree of impairment increases, and so does the risk posed to other road users. The new prescribed limits represent the point at which impairment, and thus unacceptable risk to road users, begins.

20. The new prescribed limits broadly correspond to no more than 1.5 standard drinks for males and not more than one standard drink for females, consumed three hours before driving. These are only broad illustrations for reference and do not represent the “safe” number of drinks to go below the revised limits. This is because the effects of alcohol differ significantly depending on factors such as age, sex, health and body composition. Our message remains: if you drink, do not drive. You cannot be sure of your level of impairment after drinking, and so do not take the risk.

21. As we make this amendment, the sentencing guidelines applicable to the new alcohol limits will also need to be reviewed. The Ministry’s view is that offenders who drive with very high blood alcohol levels should face imprisonment, given the significant risks such conduct poses to other road users and to enhance deterrence. We will work with the Sentencing Advisory Panel to consider issuing new sentencing guidelines for drink driving, including guidelines on when imprisonment is warranted.

New offence of driving with controlled drugs, psychoactive substances or intoxicating substances present in blood

22. Second, the Bill introduces a new offence of driving with controlled drugs, psychoactive substances or intoxicating substances, present in one’s blood. I refer to these substances collectively as “specified substances”.

23. Today, it is already an offence to drive under the influence of specified substances in a manner that results in impaired driving. However, while it is an offence to drive simply with a certain concentration of alcohol in one’s blood, there is no corresponding offence for specified substances. This is because there is no single scientifically established concentration threshold that can reliably indicate impairment across the wide range of such substances. Instead, under the current offence, the prosecution must prove not only that the driver had consumed drugs, but also that the drugs had had rendered him incapable of having proper control of the vehicle. This gives rise to significant evidential challenges. For instance, where Police officers arrive only after an incident has occurred, a positive blood test alone may not be sufficient. This is because it may not be possible to prove that the drugs had impaired driving, unless there is evidence such as in-car camera footage showing such impairment.

24. MHA has reviewed this and assessed that there should not be a need to prove impaired driving. Driving with the presence of specified substances in one’s blood is itself dangerous and should be deterred, since these specified substances – for example, etomidate – are already regulated under our existing laws and are known to impair driving ability by affecting reaction time, attention and coordination. Clause 11 therefore introduces a new offence under the new section 67(1)(c) of the RTA, where a person who drives or attempts to drive with the presence of a specified substance in his blood will commit an offence, without any need for proof that he was impaired whilst driving.

25. We recognise that there may be situations where a person lawfully consumes or administers specified substances for medicinal purposes. The Bill provides a statutory defence where the substance was lawfully consumed by or administered; and the person did not know or have reason to believe that consuming it could impair his or her driving. However, if the consumption of such substances did in fact impair the driving of the person, then there would continue to be criminal liability, as per existing law.


Enhance TP’s ability to detect and enforce against traffic offences

26. The third objective of this Bill is to enhance Traffic Police’s ability to detect and enforce against traffic offences, in four areas.

Streamline the drink-driving enforcement process

27. First, clause 14 of the Bill removes the requirement to administer a preliminary breath test, streamlining the drink-driving enforcement process. Currently, enforcement of drink-driving is a two-stage process:

(a) Upon suspicion of drink-driving, an officer administers a preliminary breath test at the roadside.

(b) If the result is positive, the driver is arrested and brought to the Police lockup, where an evidential-grade breath test is administered.

28. This process is operationally onerous and results in a lower alcohol concentration reading when the evidential-grade breath test is carried out at the lockup. It is also unnecessary as technology has improved over the years and Handheld Breath Analysers can now provide evidential-grade breath test results.

29. Clause 14 supports the Traffic Police’s use of a Handheld Breath Evidential Analyser, allowing officers to obtain evidential-grade breath test results on the spot that accurately reflects the driver's alcohol level at the time of the offence. The Traffic Police can also conduct its drink-driving enforcement operations more efficiently without having to bring the driver to the lockup.

Align the procedure of taking breath and blood specimen from hospital patients with other legislation

30. Second, the Bill aligns the procedure in the RTA for the taking of breath and blood specimens from hospital patients with that of similar provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code.

31. Currently, under the RTA, before a police officer may require a hospital patient to provide a blood specimen to determine his blood alcohol level, the registered medical practitioner in immediate charge of the patient must first authorise this. While the Act does not prescribe the mode or manner of obtaining the authorisation, in a recent judgement, the District Court held that this authorisation must be express – that is, it cannot be inferred from the doctor’s silence or failure to object. In that case, the drink-driving suspect was acquitted after the doctor treating him was found not to have explicitly authorised the taking of a blood specimen.

32. This differs from the process under the Criminal Procedure Code, which governs forensic medical examinations in non-traffic investigative contexts and does not impose similar express authorisation requirement on the treating medical practitioner.

33. Clause 16 therefore removes the authorisation requirement under the RTA, aligning it with the Criminal Procedure Code provisions. In its place, before taking a blood specimen, the medical practitioner or nurse in immediate charge of the patient must be satisfied that the taking of the specimen will not endanger the individual. The amendment removes the procedural authorisation requirement but does not diminish the medical practitioner’s or nurse’s duty to assess whether doing so would harm the patient. The safety of the patient remains paramount and continues to be assured with this amendment.

Handphone driving

34. Third, the Bill amends section 65B of the RTA, which sets out the offence of using a mobile communication device while driving. Currently, an offender must satisfy three elements to be liable for this offence:

(a) The driver must hold the mobile communication device in his hand.

(b) The driver must operate any communicative or other functions of the device.

(c) The vehicle must be in motion while the driver is holding and operating the device.

35. The requirement in element (b) – that the driver must operate a function of the device – can only be enforced by a Police officer on the ground who observes the driver operating the device while the vehicle is in motion. This is challenging to enforce practically. More importantly, there should be no need to prove that the driver was operating the device. Unlike other everyday objects, a mobile communication device is ordinarily held to communicate or access information. These are activities which typically require the driver’s visual and cognitive attention and divert their attention away from driving. Where the device is handheld, the risk of distraction is further compounded because the driver must hold and support the device, reducing the driver’s ability to maintain proper control of the vehicle.

36. Clause 10 therefore amends section 65B to remove the element stating that the driver must be operating the device. A driver who holds a mobile communicative device in his hand while the vehicle is in motion will commit an offence. This amendment also makes it clear that it is not an offence if the device is secured in a mount and a driver touches it while driving. However, where the driver’s use of a mounted device distracts the driver or compromises the driver’s control of the vehicle, the driver may be liable for offences such as careless or dangerous driving.

Automate the processing of traffic violations

37. Fourth, the Bill supports the Traffic Police’s ongoing efforts to leverage technology to scale up enforcement of traffic violations. Today, when a camera captures a vehicle committing a traffic violation, a Police officer must review the footage to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that an offence has been committed and, if so, require the owner of the vehicle to provide the particulars of the driver at the time of the alleged offence.

38. Clause 21 introduces a new section 81A, which allows a computer program to assess whether there is sufficient evidence that a traffic offence was committed and, if so, automatically issue a notice to require the vehicle owner to provide the particulars of the driver at the time of the alleged offence. This enables the Traffic Police to significantly scale up the enforcement of traffic violations and eliminate manual processes, by using video analytics in traffic enforcement cameras.

39. The Traffic Police will ensure that only computer programs that have been robustly tested are used for enforcement. The computer program will also be subject to regular audits to ensure its continued accuracy and reliability. To further safeguard against system errors, the new section allows affected vehicle owners or drivers to apply to revoke the notice if they believe that the relevant vehicle was misidentified or where the alleged offence did not occur. Where such application is made, an officer will manually review the relevant evidence that led to the issuance of the notice.


Other amendments

Clarify driving disqualification periods

40. The Bill also makes two other amendments to streamline and clarify existing provisions.

41. First, the Bill amends a number of provisions in the RTA to make clear how driving disqualification periods are calculated. The current legal language in the RTA may give rise to an interpretation that a driving disqualification period runs concurrently with an imprisonment term in certain contexts — meaning an offender effectively serves his disqualification while incarcerated and already unable to drive. In a case earlier this year, an offender was convicted of drink driving and other unrelated offences. He was not imprisoned for drink driving, but imprisoned for the unrelated offences. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 67(2) of the RTA to mean that the offender’s disqualification period should commence on the date of his drink driving conviction, despite the offender being in prison for the unrelated offences. This goes against the policy intent for the offender’s disqualification period to start only after he has served his imprisonment term, even if the imprisonment is for an offence unrelated to the offence for which the person is disqualified.

42. To give effect to this policy intent, clauses 3, 7, 8, 11, 22, 23 and 25 make similar amendments respectively to sections 42, 64, 65, 67, 84 and 116 of the RTA and section 3 of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks and Compensation) Act 1960.

43. Second, clause 24 repeals Section 133(2) of the RTA, an administrative requirement that has become obsolete. Section 133(2) of the RTA currently requires Traffic Police to prepare a duplicate of every traffic ticket notice and, if required by a court, to produce this duplicate to the court. In practice, this provision is not necessary as the courts have obtained the information they require without needing this duplicate copy from the Traffic Police.


Conclusion

44. Sir, to conclude, this Bill introduces significant amendments to the RTA to achieve the three objectives I have laid out.

45. Alongside these amendments, we announced last week that we will tighten the Driver Improvement Points System, commonly known as the demerit points regime, to be implemented from January 2027. The two key changes are the lowering of the suspension threshold from 24 demerit points to 18 and lengthening the suspension periods for errant drivers who meet this lowered threshold.

46. Together, these measures are aimed at decisively arresting the increase in traffic fatalities and injuries. But laws and enforcement alone cannot make our roads safe. Ultimately, it is the choices made by every road user — every driver, motorcyclist, cyclist, and pedestrian — that will determine whether we can reach home safe every day. We urge all road users to exercise patience and graciousness on the road. When we stay alert, slow down, or give way, we protect not just ourselves, but other road users, our families, and our loved ones.

47. Mr Speaker, in Mandarin please.

议长先生，这项法案将带来深远影响，有效提升我国的公路安全。我想借此机会，向驾驶人士传达两条重要的信息。

第一，酒后不开车，开车不喝酒。法案通过后，法定酒精浓度上限将大幅下降。科学数据一再证实，即使摄入少量酒精，也会削弱驾驶员的判断和应变能力。收紧后的酒驾标准，更准确地反映酒精对驾驶能力的实际影响。

第二，驾驶时须专注于路况，不得手握移动通讯设备、包括手机。与许多其他干扰因素不同，手持通讯设备本身会不断吸引使用者的注意力。边开车边操作通讯设备，会让驾驶员的视线偏离路面、一只手离开方向盘、分散驾驶的注意力。哪怕只是一瞬间的分神，都可能酿成无法挽回的悲剧。因此，我们必须加强驾驶时手握移动通讯设备的相关法律规定。

这些措施将进一步加强相关法律规定，提升公路安全。然而，维护公路安全，人人有责。无论是汽车驾驶员、电单车骑士、脚踏车骑士还是行人，我们在路上的一举一动，都关系到大家能不能安全出行、平安回家。我们吁请所有公路使用者保持耐心和礼让。在路上时刻保持警惕、放慢车速或让路，不只是保护自己，更是守护其他公路使用者、我们的家人和至亲。

48. Sir, I beg to move.