Second Reading of the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Bill – Wrap-Up Speech by Mr Goh Pei Ming, Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs & Senior Minister of State for Social and Family Development

Introduction

1. Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their thoughtful questions and their strong support for this Bill. Across the House yesterday and today, there has been broad agreement that scams continue to cause serious harm in Singapore, to Singaporeans and their families, and more must be done to protect Singaporeans. Members also raised important points on how we ensure that these powers are exercised responsibly and fairly.

2. Let me now address the key issues.

Account Disabling, Disclosure, and Service Limitation Orders

3. There were several questions relating to Account Disabling (ADOs), Disclosure Orders (DOs), and Service Limitation Orders (SLOs). These fall in three broad categories.

(a) One, on information exchange between the Police and service providers.

(b) Two, on the issuance of, and obligations imposed by, these Orders.

(c) Three, on the safeguards to ensure speedy recourse for persons whose accounts are disabled or restricted under these orders, but who may be victims themselves and who require access to their accounts for their basic needs.

Information exchange between the Police and service providers

4. First, on information exchange. Ms Charlene Chen asked how weak or inconclusive signals from different sources will be used to identify emerging scams. She also asked whether there will be common information disclosure standards across service providers, and whether information disclosed will be retained even if it was initially inconclusive.

5. Where the Police receives weak or inconclusive scam signals, the Police will draw on information shared by service providers and its own data sources, including Police reports or ScamShield reports, to piece the whole picture together. We will work with service providers to implement robust information disclosure standards that are operationally feasible. We will only retain information for as long as is operationally necessary.

6. Ms Elysa Chen asked who will administer and disseminate information to service providers on the National Scams List, or NSL, and whether an individual whose name has been shared with service providers will be notified.

7. The Police will issue and inform service providers of ADOs, DOs, and SLOs. We will not notify individuals that their details have been shared with service providers. Doing so will be counterproductive, as it may prematurely inform or alert scammers and their mules that their criminal activities have been detected.

8. Ms Diana Pang asked if the information exchange framework will strengthen our ability to track the flow of scam proceeds across financial institutions in real time. Fund tracing is critical to the recovery of scam proceeds. However, the primary purpose of the information exchange supported by this Bill is to intervene upstream to identify and disrupt scam-linked accounts, even before they are being used to receive scam proceeds. Meanwhile, I assure the Member that we are actively working to improve our fund-tracing capabilities. Many members may be familiar with the Anti-Scam Centre, which has co-located banks with the Police since 2019 to facilitate real-time coordination in fund recovery efforts. Since March 2025, the Anti-Scam Centre has operationalised the Crypto Tracing Team to address the emerging threat of scam proceeds being rapidly dissipated via cryptocurrencies. In 2025, Crypto Tracing Team successfully recovered S$22.8 million worth of virtual assets across 1,800 cases, and helped prevent S$8.8 million in losses through 360 victim interventions.

Issuance thresholds and obligations imposed

9. Second, Ms Diana Pang and Ms Elysa Chen asked about the thresholds that will be applied before an ADO or SLO is issued. An ADO may be issued if there is suspicion or reason to believe that an account has been or will be used preparatory to, or in furtherance of, scam-related offences. SLOs may be issued if the Police suspect or have reason to believe that an identified individual or entity will use a scam-enabling service to commit or facilitate a scam-related offence. The threshold of “suspicion or reason to believe” strikes the right balance between enabling early intervention to prevent scams, while maintaining a sufficiently high evidentiary threshold.

10. The Police will independently assess the facts and circumstances of every case to ensure that the legal threshold is met before issuing an Order. I would like to emphasise that this is no different from assessments that the Police make today when exercising existing powers under the Criminal Procedure Code.

11. To Ms Elysa Chen and Mr Fadli Fawzi’s queries, SLOs will be used only against mules under investigation who are at risk of further facilitating scams, and mules who have been warned, issued composition fines, prosecuted, or convicted.

12. Ms Diana Pang asked if individuals whose bank accounts have been disabled will know that the account was disabled pursuant to an order from the Police or voluntarily by the service provider. The Police will inform affected account holders of an ADO through appropriate channels as soon as practicable after it is issued. We are working with sector regulators to operationalise this. An appeal channel will also be made available.

13. Mr Jackson Lam asked how quickly service providers will be expected to act against suspicious accounts flagged by an Order, and whether there will be a common standard across service providers.

14. The turnaround time for Orders will be determined in consultation with service providers, balancing the need for swift response with operational feasibility for our industry partners.

15. Mr Muhaimin Malik asked why the Government decided to set the duration of an ADO at 30 days. The period of 30 days is operationally necessary for scam disruption. This includes providing enough time for the Police to assess if further action on the account is required. To be clear, ADOs can impose a requirement to disable the account specified for up to 30 days. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Police may specify a shorter duration or cancel the ADO ahead of its expiry if it is no longer necessary.

16. I agree with Ms Charlene Chen that merely targeting individuals via ADOs is insufficient to effectively dismantle a scammer’s network. The data sharing ecosystem that this Bill supports goes beyond that.

(a) When the Police issue an ADO to a service provider, the Police may also share information relating to that account with other relevant service providers. Service providers can in turn identify and review associated accounts within their own ecosystems for any scam-related activity, such as accounts which may have transacted with the disabled account.

(b) If a service provider identifies an associated account that meets the conditions prescribed by the Police in a DO, it is required to provide the relevant information to the Police.

(c) The Police will then assess the information, and if appropriate, share it further with other service providers to review and action. And this process will continue and can continue to repeat, as we map out and take down the scammer’s ecosystem of enablers.

(d) This ‘fanning out’ process strengthens our ability to uncover and dismantle wider scam account networks beyond disabling individual accounts.

Recourse for persons who are innocent or who genuinely need access to disabled or restricted accounts

17. Third, I will touch on the recourse available to those whose accounts were disabled or restricted. However, before that, allow me to reiterate why we need to take a firm stand on this.

18. Members are right to ask about the risks of moving quickly against suspected scam activity, and the corrective measures that will be in place. Now, no one wants to inadvertently affect or inconvenience persons who may not have been involved in scam activity.

19. Sir, at the same time, disrupting scams quickly and decisively is essential. In a recent case, scammers deceived a 68-year-old victim into believing that he was working remotely under the employment of a legitimate company. By the time officers engaged the victim, the victim had already transferred 80% of his life savings, or approximately S$128,000, in cryptocurrency to the scammer. He was also on the verge of transferring another S$64,000 of borrowed funds to the scammer. The money was not recovered.

20. Such cases remind us that scam losses are often deeply personal and can have lasting consequences for the victim and their families. On average, about S$2 million was lost to scams every day in the first half of this year. Members would have heard, and have heard, of similar cases when engaging your residents or within this House over yesterday and today.

21. The Orders enable us to constrict the supply of scam enablers and disable them before they can be used, and this is ultimately to protect our citizens.

22. Our task here is to intervene early, while ensuring adequate safeguards against innocent accounts being affected by these Orders.

23. Ms Diana Pang rightly pointed out that even as we enhance information sharing on scam intelligence across institutions, we must correct erroneous information and inform relevant institutions of the correction quickly. We will work with service providers to operationalise this.

24. Ms Pang also asked if there will be periodic reviews to assess whether restrictions remain necessary. Mr Kenneth Poon and Mr Fadli Fawzi also asked how legislative levers will be applied to individuals who were manipulated into becoming scam mules. The Government needs to take a firm stand, a firm approach towards scam mules. Those who enable or facilitate scams will face the full force of the law. That said, we agree that penalties must be proportionate to the level of culpability.

25. In relation to SLOs, although three years is the maximum duration allowed by law, the actual duration will depend on the individual’s circumstances and assessed scam risk. First-time mules will generally face one year of restrictions, while longer durations may be warranted for repeat offenders or those assessed to pose a sustained scam risk.

(a) Let me share one example. In 2024, before the introduction of the current Facility Restriction Framework, one individual received a conditional warning after allowing her bank account to be used for the receipt and transfer of scam proceeds. After the case concluded, she then allowed her accounts with two other banks to be used in a similar manner, with one of these accounts later receiving $8,000 in proceeds from another scam victim.

(b) Placing such individuals on SLOs not only better protects the public from scams, but also prevents these individuals from being drawn further into unlawful activities by scammers and getting themselves into further trouble.

26. Mr Gabriel Lam, Mr Jackson Lam, Ms Charlene Chen, Ms Diana Pang, and Ms Hazlina Halim asked if an expedited appeal mechanism can be established where an ADO or SLO materially affects a person’s livelihood, or where an innocent person’s account was disabled. Ms Elysa Chen suggested having an independent appeal channel outside the Police or having a prescribed appeal response time in subsidiary legislation.

27. A swift and decisive approach to disrupting scam networks is necessary to protect Singaporeans. At the same time, we recognise that some individuals may genuinely require and depend on these accounts affected by these Orders for their livelihoods or daily expenses.

28. It is thus important that we assess appeals fairly and as quickly as possible. We will share more details on the appeal mechanism, including the appeal timeline, before operationalisation of these Orders. This needs careful consideration, as we have seen cases of scammers coaching victims on what to say to bank staff to evade detection when they transfer money to the scammer. We should similarly expect scammers to coach mules to file a successful appeal to regain access to their accounts.

29. Mr Victor Lye, Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Diana Pang asked about having stronger safeguards to ensure that individuals who are subject to banking restrictions continue to have access to basic banking services for daily living. Ms Pang and Mr Kenneth Poon asked if restrictions to stop suspicious transactions will still allow essential living needs to be met and if arrangements could be made for verified payments to go through while suspicious transactions are restricted.

30. Mr Fadli Fawzi and Ms Elysa Chen suggested that as a default, these individuals should still be allowed to make basic transactions subject to a daily cap, with a full freeze reserved only for clearly high-risk cases. Ms He Ting Ru asked about the banking restrictions imposed on individuals whose accounts have been restricted under the Facility Restriction Framework.

(a) I wish to reassure the House that we will not prevent individuals from accessing funds that they genuinely need for daily living.

(b) Individuals subject to banking restrictions under SLOs may still transact personally at the Bank over the counter. We will only restrict access to self-service banking services like internet banking, mobile banking or ATM services, which are more prone to being exploited for scams. Incoming transactions, such as salaries and Government payouts, will continue to be processed as usual.

(c) Where the individual needs access to funds in an account disabled by an ADO, the individual may apply to the Police for access to a reasonable amount of money for daily expenses. The individual may similarly apply to the Police for access to additional amounts of money for necessary expenses, such as utilities and rental payments. Requests will be assessed on a case-by-case basis and may be submitted and assessed independently of an appeal against an Order.

(d) We are also mindful that if the individual is a scam mule, the funds within the disabled account may in fact not belong to him, but to other scam victims. Nevertheless, once the Police assess that the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with banks to enable this as quickly as possible.

31. MAS is also working with banks to preserve access to basic banking services for individuals whose accounts have been closed. In 2025, major retail banks offered close to 8,300 Limited Purpose Banking Accounts, or LPBAs. We will enhance this from October this year. Going forward, the local banks will offer an LPBA or an alternative basic bank account to every affected Singapore citizen or permanent resident, except in very limited cases. Examples of such exclusions include individuals who are subject to financial sanctions imposed by the United Nations, have been involved in terrorism financing, or refuse to cooperate with banks’ customer due diligence processes. MAS will continue to monitor instances of unbanked individuals and work with banks to minimise undue financial exclusion.

32. Ms Gho Sze Kee asked about safeguards against service providers refusing service to individuals who have appeared on the NSL, or who have been the subject of an ADO or SLO. Ms Elysa Chen and Ms Diana Pang also asked whether such individuals will have the same right of appeal as subjects of ADOs or SLOs.

33. Members have rightly pointed out that service providers may voluntarily decide to disable the accounts of individuals whose details have been shared with them. We strongly encourage service providers to proactively act against scam accounts, without waiting to be compelled by a formal order.

34. We understand Members’ reservations about encouraging private entities to take voluntary action. Indeed, these entities may not be held to the same fiduciary duties or public accountability that Government agencies have. But let me make two points here.

35. First, the sharing of an individual’s information with a service provider for the purpose of crime prevention is not new. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Police may already freeze bank accounts or phone lines.

36. The possibility of service providers denying service to individuals linked to such accounts or phone lines on their own accord, even after the conclusion of their case, therefore already exists. What the Bill does do is to lower the threshold for sharing such information with service providers, and to act swiftly against suspected scam activity.

37. Second, the question before us is fundamentally whether we are prepared to intervene early enough to prevent harm. If we are serious about doing this, we cannot expect the Police or Government to do this alone. Service providers are often best placed to detect suspicious activity first because they operate the platforms, the systems and the accounts being exploited by scammers. In a NSL pilot trial conducted with the banking sector, every suspicious bank account shared with participating banks led, on average, to the proactive detection of one additional suspicious account by the banks. This shows how much more we can do together if industry too plays a more proactive and upstream role in detecting and acting against suspected scam activities, with appropriate safeguards in place, for sure.

38. The proposed provisions in the Bill are intended to strike a careful balance between giving service providers sufficient latitude to act against scams without fear of liability, while providing guardrails to prevent abuse. For example:

(a) The protection from civil liability for voluntary actions only apply where the service provider acts in good faith and reasonable care, and for the purpose of preventing or detecting scam-related offences. This means service providers cannot act arbitrarily or with improper motive, and still claim protection.

(b) Service providers also remain subject to the oversight of their respective sectoral regulators, such as MAS for financial institutions and IMDA for telcos. Any pattern of abuse or reckless handling of consumers’ data or information may still attract regulatory scrutiny and, where appropriate, enforcement action under the relevant sectoral regime.

39. To Members’ questions on appeals, if a service provider decides to disable an account on its own accord, the service provider may review and decide whether to reinstate the account.

40. Ms Elysa Chen asked whether Singpass restrictions imposed under the Facility Restriction Framework may inadvertently lock individuals out of key government services. I assure the Member that this is not the case. The Singpass restrictions will only be targeted at services that are at higher risk of being exploited for scams, such as opening a bank account. Services listed by the Member, namely voting, healthcare, and CPF matters, remain fully accessible. Even for restricted services, individuals are not locked out entirely – it is still possible to open a bank account without Singpass.

41. Mr Gabriel Lam, Ms Charlene Chen, Ms He Ting Ru and Mr Jackson Lam asked if statistics on ADOs and SLOs, and on appeals filed against these Orders, will be published. Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if statistics on bank accounts frozen by the Police could be published. Mr Victor Lye suggested collecting data on the number of individuals who become unbanked or remain subject to banking restrictions following the Police’s intervention measures, as well as the duration of such restrictions. I thank the Members for the suggestions, which we will consider.

Offences Relating to the Misuse of Online Accounts

42. Next, on the new offences targeting misuse of online accounts. Dealing with the network of scam accounts is a crucial anti-scam strategy since these accounts are essential for scammers. Criminalising the misuse of online accounts addresses a scam modus operandi that we are already seeing in practice.

(a) In one case, a 30-year-old man came across a post on Telegram soliciting Carousell account holders who were willing to let their accounts be used for ‘business purposes’. Enticed by the promise of fast cash, he contacted the buyer and subsequently converted his Carousell account into a professional account, which would require the completion of verification by linking his Singpass account. He also replaced the registered email address of the Carousell account and subsequently surrendered the login credentials to the buyer. The account was subsequently misused to facilitate scams.

43. Ms Elysa Chen suggested setting a minimum gain threshold, such that the presumption will only apply if the person provided their personal information or supplied an online account in exchange for gain that exceeds this threshold. We have concerns with such an approach. Whatever gain threshold we set, scam mules are likely to endeavour to go below it to escape liability and frustrate law enforcement efforts. The Government’s view is that the presumption should apply so long as there is gain, no matter how small.

44. Ms Chen also asked if a situation where a mule supplies an account on a designated online service to a scammer, but where the account is only used to establish contact with the victim but not for the actual commission of the scam, would be covered by the new offences. Section 39GA criminalises the supplying of a designated online account if the person knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the account would be used to commit or facilitate the commission by any person of any offence. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that a specific offence occurred.

45. Ms Diana Pang asked if the penalties are tiered based on the degree of the offender’s involvement and if the penalties are sufficiently deterrent. MHA’s assessment is that the current penalties are adequately tiered and sufficiently deterrent. We enhanced the penalties in October 2025 when MHA introduced caning as a penalty for scam mules, with higher penalties for scammers and members or recruiters of scam syndicates. The Sentencing Advisory Panel has also published sentencing guidelines for scams-related offences to provide clarity on the recommended sentences for scams-related offenders. To send a strong deterrent signal, the Guidelines recommend that custodial sentences should be the norm and lay out the aggravating factors that would warrant an uplift in sentencing.

Use of Computer Program to Issue OCHA Directions

46. Let me now move on to the questions relating to the Online Criminal Harms Act, or OCHA.

47. First, on the amendment allowing a computer program to issue OCHA directions. Ms Elysa Chen, Ms Diana Pang, Ms Hazlina Halim, Ms He Ting Ru, Mr Muhaimin Malik and Mr Jackson Lam asked about the safeguards in place to ensure that the computer program operates accurately, fairly and according to law. The program has been trained on clear criteria for identifying scam content and tested in parallel with human supervision to ensure a high level of accuracy. Any future program that we may use will meet similar levels of rigor, if not higher. Post-deployment, we will maintain oversight of the program through measures such as human intervention on low confidence cases, audit checks on blocked websites, and periodic reviews of the program’s performance based on metrics such as precision rate, to ensure that it continues to operate as intended. Designated Officers remain responsible and accountable for the directions issued by the program. We are confident that the program will be able to continue maintaining a high level of accuracy when issuing OCHA directions. The number of reconsideration requests received for OCHA Directions presently is very low. Out of over 70,000 website-blocking Directions issued in 2026, the Police only received six reconsideration requests – six out of 70,000. And seeing this 70,000 number I can’t help be reminded of Ms Elysa Chen’s zombie analogy: that when you kill one, more pops up. And therefore, we need to be able to use AI and technology to be able to fight this scourge.

48. The Government has been exploring the application of AI for scam disruption for a long time now, before this was raised in the Worker’s Party Manifesto in 2025. For example, the AI-powered classifier for ScamShield was developed in the first quarter of 2024 and operationalised a few months later. This has helped to identify scam content submitted by users with a high precision rate, and gives us confidence as we explore expanding AI use cases in scam disruption in areas where speed and scale are critical.

49. Several Members asked about the review process. For appeals against any OCHA direction, including those given by a computer program, the existing appeal mechanism continues to apply. We understand OCHA Directions can have a serious impact on affected individuals and businesses, and we are committed to reviewing appeals expeditiously. While the time taken for appeals depend on the nature and complexity of the appeals, the review can be expected to be completed within 7 days for straightforward and unambiguous appeals. For more complex cases, a longer timeline may be required.

50. Ms He Ting Ru asked if the Government would publicise performance indicators on directions issued by a computer program in future. I thank her for the suggestion, which we will consider.

Enhanced Penalty Regime for Non-Compliance with OCHA Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives

51. Next, I will address queries relating to the enhanced penalty regime for Codes of Practice and Implementation Directives.

52. Mr Jackson Lam asked how the Code of Practice framework deals with content generated using AI. I agree with the Member that we must take an outcome-based approach, and our Codes of Practice do prescribe outcomes which designated online service providers are required to meet. We have taken care to prescribe these outcomes in a technologically neutral manner so that they remain relevant regardless of whether a scam is conducted using AI.

53. Mr Gabriel Lam asked how the powers under the enhanced enforcement regime will be used in practice. Ms Hazlina Halim asked about the factors that the Competent Authority will consider in deciding the quantum of the financial penalty. The decision to issue a financial penalty or direct the platform to rectify the non-compliance, as well as the quantum of financial penalty to impose, will depend on a variety of factors. This includes the nature and severity of the non-compliance, and the culpability and compliance track record of the platform. Our objective is for platforms to rectify their non-compliance, and the appropriate course of action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

54. Mr Gabriel Lam also asked if we have considered a shared-responsibility model where banks, telcos, and online platforms each have statutory duties to prevent scams within their own ecosystems. I agree that tackling scams must be a shared responsibility. This principle underpins our anti-scam strategy and is reflected throughout this Bill. Government, banks, telcos, online platforms and individuals all have a role to play in preventing scams and reducing harm.

55. While the enhanced OCHA enforcement regime applies to designated online services, we already have legal powers to take enforcement action against banks and telcos if necessary, whether through criminal offences or through MAS’s and IMDA’s regulatory regimes.

56. Ms Hazlina Halim asked how an instance of non-compliance will be assessed in practice. This will depend on the requirement in question. For example, if a service provider is required to meet a certain outcome, each failure to meet the outcome may be considered a separate instance. Designated online service providers should therefore rectify non-compliance as quickly as possible, to avoid new penalties arising from further instances of non-compliance.

Civilian Specialist Officers

57. Allow me to now move to the next set of issues on Civilian Specialist Officers, or CSOs.

58. Mr Muhaimin Malik asked where CSOs would be deployed and where CSOs would be recruited from. I thank the Member for recognising the strain that our law enforcement resources are placed under. CSOs may be recruited directly from the market or may be seconded from other public agencies, such as the Cyber Security Agency. CSOs will be deployed to complement Police resources in existing units, starting from the Cyber Command. CSOs will fall under the prevailing Police command structures and will be recruited through established channels to bring in specialised civilian expertise that can augment Police’s operational capabilities.

59. Ms Elysa Chen, Mr Jackson Lam and Ms Diana Pang sought assurances on safeguards to ensure that CSOs can be entrusted with sensitive investigations. Similar to Commercial Affairs Officers today, CSOs will undergo the necessary operational and investigative training, and will be carefully selected based on their suitability for investigation work and relevant technical expertise. They remain subject to the same oversight, accountability and command structures as other investigation officers.

60. To Ms Diana Pang’s further query, members of the public can identify CSOs by their warrant cards, similar to plain clothes police officers and Commercial Affairs Officers today. If unsure, members of the public may call the Police hotline to verify the CSO’s legitimacy.

Furnishing Information on Recipients of Restriction Orders

61. Ms He Ting Ru asked what additional prescribed information banks may be required to provide under Clause 6 of the Bill. The provision allows Police to obtain necessary information to notify persons who have been issued a Restriction Order. These persons have been identified to be at risk of falling prey to a scam. Any prescribed information will be in service of this narrow intent of preventing harm to a potential scam victim. The wider principle of banking secrecy remains unaffected.

General Anti-Scam Measures

62. Finally, allow me to address questions relating to other aspects of our anti-scam strategy.

63. Mr Muhaimin Malik asked if there are any service standards governing the lifting of accounts frozen for investigations pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, or CPC. The duration for which an account is frozen varies from case to case depending on the duration required for investigations or court proceedings. As a safeguard, the CPC requires that the Police make a report of the seizure to the relevant Court once the property is no longer required for investigations or court proceedings, or within one year after the date of seizure, whichever is earlier.

64. Once the freeze is no longer required, the Police will apply to the Court for an order to lift the freeze. Banks are expected to give effect to Court orders as soon as practicable upon receipt. Individuals whose bank accounts are frozen can also apply to the Courts for the release of funds to pay for basic living expenses or other essential spending.

65. Mr Fadli Fawzi asked if the Police intend to continue using CPC powers to freeze bank accounts, or if the Police will use ADOs instead. We see ADOs as complementary to CPC powers. CPC powers are primarily investigative in nature and are generally exercised when there is sufficient evidence linking an account to an offence. On the other hand, ADOs can be exercised at a lower threshold to allow the Police to keep pace with the speed at which scam syndicates can create and replace accounts.

66. Ms He Ting Ru asked about the average processing time for a request to withdraw funds for accounts subject to a Restriction Order today, and whether the Government will work with banks to develop a system that allows for graduated restrictions. To the former, requests relating to funds for legitimate purposes, such as daily expenses and bills, are processed quickly to minimise inconvenience to Restriction Order recipients. To the latter, I would refer her to MHA’s response to a similar Parliamentary Question filed by Mr Kenneth Tiong for the sitting on 4 March 2026. Recipients of Restriction Orders may access funds for legitimate purposes amid safeguards against further transfers to scammers. We have therefore assessed that graduated restrictions are not necessary for now.

67. Ms Hazlina Halim and Ms He Ting Ru asked if anti-scam public education is tailored for different demographic segments such as seniors and young adults. Ms Jessica Tan also spoke about the importance of investing in public education, community outreach, and digital literacy programmes. The Government has rolled out targeted public education efforts. For example, to make anti-scam public education material more elderly-friendly, the Police have published material with bite-sized messages in vernacular languages, using larger fonts and clear visuals. The Police have also worked closely with government agencies such as the Agency for Integrated Care to deliver anti-scam public education through touch points frequented by the elderly. We even inject scam messages into Getai performances, and we have similar outreach efforts for other groups, such as our youth. We also recently concluded the National Simulated Scams Exercise held between March and August this year, which involved the use of robo-callers to simulate calls from scammers to strengthen participants’ anti-scam resilience. We will continue to invest in anti-scam public education as a key safeguard against scams, as this is what we need to do to protect our population. And a vigilant population is ultimately the most important safeguard.

68. Mr Jackson Lam asked if the Bill strengthens our ability to cooperate with regional partners, and whether we will be conducting more joint operations with our counterparts following the success of Operation FRONTIER+ III. International cooperation is critical in disrupting scams and recovering assets, and I assure Members that we are working actively in this area. FRONTIER+ now covers 15 jurisdictions, with the United States and the Philippines joining earlier this year. We are encouraging more jurisdictions to join and work together on cross-border enforcement and asset recovery. The passing of this Bill also allows us to demonstrate to our international counterparts Singapore’s national resolve to combat scams.

69. Ms Elysa Chen asked if the Government will consider widening the scope of the Shared Responsibility Framework to cover more variants of scams as well as cryptocurrency platforms, whether the Government will consider a private right of civil action for scam victims against offenders and non-compliant service providers, and whether financial penalties imposed on non-compliant platforms can be redistributed to scam victims. Mr Gerald Giam suggested that the Government explore setting up an independent investigative mechanism under the Shared Responsibility Framework to complement internal bank assessments and provide a neutral dispute review for customers. Mr Giam further asked the Government to consider establishing a statutory victim compensation framework. Ms He Ting Ru also suggested a scam victim restitution fund, as well as an insurance scheme to cover losses from scams.

70. These queries fall outside the ambit of the Bill and will require an involved answer. Regardless, let me assure Members that the Government is committed to helping scam victims recover their losses wherever possible. The key challenge is one of asset recovery, as scam proceeds are often dissipated very quickly, and it is not always possible for the Police to recover and return to the victims all monies lost by then. I invite Ms Chen, Ms He and Mr Giam to file separate Parliamentary Questions on your queries. Regarding expanding the Shared Responsibility Framework, a related Parliamentary Question has been filed by Dr Hamid Razak for the sitting on or after 10 September. I invite Ms Chen to look out for the response.

71. Mr Gerald Giam asked if there was an update on MHA’s assessment of the establishment of a scam victim recovery fund following his PQ in February 2025. There are several operational challenges that need to be carefully considered, including the co-mingling of criminal proceeds, the fact that the amount of funds recovered is but a fraction of the amount lost, and the potential of moral hazard.

72. Mr Giam further asked the Government to study the feasibility of a standardised public anti-scam rating system by MAS and IMDA to encourage the industry to enhance security measures and consumer transparency. MAS and IMDA already work closely with the industry to enhance their anti-scam safeguards, even without such a rating. Publishing such a rating also risks inadvertently exposing the weaknesses of industry players, which could be exploited by scammers.

73. Ms Jessica Tan also suggested that the Government continue to work with industry to tap on advanced technologies to disrupt scams before they reach businesses and users. She also suggested stepping up information sharing between the Government and service providers further to allow for automated, real-time alerts of suspicious behaviour, implementing pre-emptive restrictions for high-risk accounts, and mandatory rapid response protocols for service providers. These are good suggestions. The Government will indeed continue to work closely with industry to disrupt scams quickly and with precision.

Conclusion

74. Mr Speaker Sir, we have come some way in our fight against scams. But as I mentioned earlier, about S$2 million of our citizens’ hard-earned money is still lost to scammers every single day. We still have much to do.

75. This Bill gives the Government the tools to enable swifter, more proactive and decisive action against scams. This builds on the comprehensive anti-scam strategy that we have developed in recent years. We are working to disrupt and counter scams on all fronts – legislation, industry and international cooperation, leveraging cutting-edge technology, public education, and the list goes on. We will leave no stone unturned. But the Government cannot do this alone. Service providers must do more to protect their platforms and their users. Individuals must remain vigilant and take responsibility for protecting themselves and those around them.

76. Government, industry and the public must stand together. When we do, scammers have fewer places to hide, fewer tools to exploit, and fewer opportunities to cause harm. I seek Members’ support on this Bill, to move decisively and reflect this House’s commitment to fight scams and better protect our people.

77. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.